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Existing representations for multiattribute ceteris paribus preference statements have
provided useful treatments and clear semantics for qualitative comparisons, but have
not provided similarly clear representations or semantics for comparisons involving
quantitative tradeoffs. We use directional derivatives and other concepts from elementary
differential geometry to interpret conditional multiattribute ceteris paribus preference
comparisons that state bounds on quantitative tradeoff ratios. This semantics extends the
familiar economic notion of marginal rate of substitution to multiple continuous or discrete
attributes. The same geometric concepts also provide means for interpreting statements
about the relative importance of different attributes.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Building value functions from preferences and tradeoffs
Knowledge of someone’s preferences can be used to make decisions on their behalf. Following the work of von Neumann
and Morgenstern [35], direct and complete elicitation of preferences and their representation in the form of utility functions
has enabled decision analysts to advise decision makers on how to decide speciﬁc questions. To go beyond manual construc-
tion of speciﬁc decision models, and to automate decision analysis in a way that applies in a broad range of mundane and
ﬂeeting human activities, one must ﬁnd richer representations that permit making decisions with imprecise, incomplete,
and accumulating information about preferences.
We pursue this end by presenting semantics for several different types of preference statements that build on earlier
semantics for ceteris paribus preferences (preference other things being equal) [38,14]. We focus on quantitative tradeoff
statements, such as “having a CPU speed of 3 GHz is at least twice as important as having 4 GB memory and a 250 GB disk
in my new computer purchase.” Such statements say that some outcomes that satisfy one condition (CPU speed of 3 GHz)
are preferred to some outcomes that satisfy another condition (4 GB memory and 250 GB disk), and also bound below
how much better the former are than the latter. We provide semantics for numerous types of statements of this charac-
ter, including multiattribute tradeoffs that relate more than one attribute at a time; tradeoffs over discrete or continuous
domains; conditional or unconditional tradeoffs; and quantitative or purely qualitative comparisons. We also treat related
types of statements about attribute importance, such as “increasing CPU speed is at least twice as important as increasing
memory and disk size in my new computer purchase.” Such statements say that the weight given to some attribute or
attributes in a decision should be greater than that given to other attributes.
Computing expected utility of actions requires a numerical utility or value function that represents preferences in the
sense that the numerical representation assigns a greater value to one outcome than to a second outcome if the preference
statements entail that the ﬁrst outcome is preferred to the second. Building on earlier constructions [32], we accompany
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses:mmcgeach@csail.mit.edu (M. McGeachie), Jon_Doyle@ncsu.edu (J. Doyle).0004-3702/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2010.11.014
M. McGeachie, J. Doyle / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 1122–1152 1123the semantics for ceteris paribus preferences statements with companion algorithms for compiling utility or value functions
from collections of multiattribute tradeoff statements.
1.1. Decision-analytic methodology
Our methodology seeks to extend traditional decision analysis by relaxing assumptions and restrictions on the form and
character of the preference information captured in the preference acquisition process. In particular, we aim for represen-
tations of preference information that permit automation of the process of constructing decision models starting at earlier
points in the process than has been possible with traditional modeling methods.
In traditional decision analysis methodology [33,25], a human decision analyst does considerable work in understanding
and analyzing a decision informally before the point at which the tools of traditional decision theory [35,34,19] are brought
to bear. The decision analyst ﬁrst interviews the decision maker about what dimensions or attributes of the decision are of
consequence. The decision analyst then assesses utility functions on each of these dimensions by standard gambles or other
means. This assessment requires the decision maker to think carefully about the upper and lower bounds of each dimension,
to consider his or her attitude toward risky hypothetical choices, and to determine which attributes are utility independent
of other attributes. The relative importance of each dimension must then be assessed, at which point the decision analyst
can combine the results into a multiattribute utility function that models the preferences of the decision maker.
This traditional methodology has the virtue of producing considered and complete decision models appropriate to the
decision at hand. It also, however, demands much effort on the part of the decision maker by requiring careful attention
to complexities of the decision that might not have been considered previously, and that perhaps should not be answered
immediately with only the information currently on hand. All this makes the interviewing and analysis steps lengthy and
time-consuming in many cases, so that one mainly applies decision analysis in detail to repetitive decisions in which the cost
of analysis can be amortized over many individual decisions, and to one-off decisions of great import, such as governmental
policy or complicated life-or-death medical decisions.
We seek to begin the process of formalization earlier than with traditional decision analytic techniques. The traditional
formal techniques apply once the analyst has done much of the work needed to identify the dimensions along which pref-
erences vary. Our preference semantics allows one to formalize partial information about preferences. Such information may
be stated and captured naturally without any requirement that the stated preferences involve independent or fundamental
attributes, and without explicit indications of utility independence or preferential independence. In our view, such inde-
pendence relations properly reﬂect conclusions reached during the analysis of some decision, as inferences from the whole
body of stated conditions on preferences, rather than presuppositions underlying the entire analysis. We thus address the
identiﬁcation of dependencies and independencies among attributes in our numerical-compilation methods, which perform
analyses that yield model-structuring conclusions akin to those reached by a human analyst at the point at which the
human analyst begins quantitative assessment procedures. Our approach thus supports protracted incremental deliberation
prior to the introduction of traditional formal decision analysis, and helps automate the initial steps previously relegated to
informal reasoning that produce the formal framing of a problem.
1.2. Illustration
To illustrate these ideas, we describe a ﬁctitious scenario in which Mike, a human, informs an automated personal
shopping agent of his preferences so that it can watch for online deals on computer hardware he may ﬁnd attractive. Mike
will buy a new laptop if there is a good deal on one he likes. Mike does not try to tell the agent all about his preferences at
the start, as without detailed knowledge of what is currently available he might not yet have developed deﬁnite preferences
regarding the options. Mike instead gives his agent information about his preferences bit by bit as he learns more about
what preferences are germane.
His agent retrieves a list of laptops for sale at various vendors’ websites. Seeing the list, Mike decides that, with respect
to price and speed, a $1500, 3 GHz machine is preferable to a $2000, 3.4 GHz machine, other things being equal. This
preference sets up a tradeoff between price and speed, so the agent then ﬁlters out the results that are very expensive even
though they are somewhat faster than average. Thinking about it a little more, Mike decides that the ﬁrst machine is much
better than the other one, in fact that it is at least ﬁve times better.
Looking at some of the expensive options with many attractive features, Mike then realizes that adding features and
adding ounces of weight at the same time is not what he wants. Mike tells the agent that Weight is more important than
Price. The agent readjusts its evaluation of options, and shows more laptops ordered by weight, with several attractive
light-weight options at the top of the list.
Mike sees that there are some good machines available that are light, moderately powerful, and within his price range,
but realizes that he must decide how big a screen and what resolution he needs to do his work on the road, since this
adversely impacts the price and the weight. Mike decides a 12′′ screen on a 4.5 pound machine for $1700 is better than a
14′′ screen on a 6 pound machine for $1800. This suﬃces to order the remaining options in a way that satisﬁes Mike, and
ends up earmarking a machine for later consideration and probable purchase.
Our intent in this paper is to provide meanings for the sorts of statements Mike makes and rationales for the conclusions
Mike draws. We do not treat the hard problems of preference elicitation, of coaxing Mike to reveal his preferences through
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which differs from that required by traditional decision analysis.
For example, Mike never explicitly considers whether some attribute or other is fundamental or independent of other
attributes. Indeed, at some point he might discover that computer manufacturers offer differing amounts of memory de-
pending on which operating system is installed. Mike also does not think too carefully about the relative weights that might
be assigned to different dimensions in a hypothetical value function. He knows that one product is much more attractive
than the other, and makes guesses as to how much more attractive, guesses that he might later revise to produce a different
set of options and ﬁnal decision, as in [13].
1.3. Semantical approach
To accompany the methodology of incremental interpretation and revision of preference information, we interpret trade-
off preference statements as constraints on the shape of a utility or value function, and in particular, as constraints on the
partial derivatives in different regions of the space of outcomes.
For example, a decision maker could state that “Increased longevity is ﬁve times as important as decreased price,”
a sentiment which one might express in the context of repainting one’s home, and this is interpreted as indicating that
value increases in the increasing lifetime direction ﬁve times faster than value increases in the decreasing price direction.
The tradeoff interpretation presented in this very simple example is one treated in standard economics as the notion of
marginal rate of substitution between the two commodities longevity and price. The partial derivative of the utility function u
over commodity bundles with respect to an attribute α, is known as the marginal utility of α, and represents the marginal
impact of this commodity on utility. To compare the impact on utility due to changes in commodity α relative to commod-
ity β , one divides the marginal utility of α by the marginal utility of β . This ratio is invariant under monotone increasing
transforms of u, and is variously called the rate of commodity substitution of β for α and the marginal rate of substitution of β
for α, and expresses the amounts of α and β that can be exchanged without changing desirability [24]. Thus in the formal
marginal rate conception, one would restate “Increased longevity is ﬁve times as important as decreased price” as “Increas-
ing longevity by one unit of longevity would be as good to me as decreasing price by ﬁve units of price.” To stipulate that








at each outcome a.
In practice, however, one cannot always rely on tradeoffs to concern only two decision attributes. For example, a person
building a computer might state a preference for AMD and Overclocked over Intel and Cheaper, other things being equal. To
handle such preferences, our semantics extends the approach taken in inequality (1) to complex multivariate, discrete, and
qualitative comparisons by using the more general notion of directional derivative.
A directional derivative Dx(v) of a function v :Rn →R evaluated at a point a ∈Rn is the derivative along a vector with
base a and direction x. Furthermore, the directional derivative of a function v in the direction of vector x is equal in value
to the inner product ∇v · x of the gradient of the function with x. This quantity measures the increase of v in the direction
of x. Thus if we want to talk about constraints on the directional derivatives of the value function, or rates of increase in
the directions of x and y, we can state constraints of the form
∇u(a) · x r∇u(a) · y. (2)
In the following, we show how such constraints can, in turn, be represented as inequalities among directional derivatives of
value functions over continuous or discrete attributes.
1.4. Plan of the paper
Section 2 summarizes past approaches to representation of preference information, along with traditional independence
concepts used in analyzing the structure of preferences, including the notion of generalized additive independence used
in our construction algorithms. Section 3 presents background concepts and deﬁnitions that will be useful throughout,
namely the familiar concepts of preference orders, value functions, and what it means for a value function to represent
a preference order. This section also introduces a language for partial descriptions of outcomes called “bundles” (of goods)
together with useful operations on bundles and descriptions of bundles in vector terms. Section 4 introduces an extension of
ﬁrst-order logic for expressing speciﬁcations of preferences and tradeoffs in a way that ﬁts the methodology of incremental
speciﬁcation and interpretation. The subsequent sections present the semantics of the preference and tradeoff extensions.
Sections 5 through 7 constitute the semantical core of the paper. Section 5 provides meanings for a range of types of
preference and tradeoff statements including tradeoffs between concrete alternatives described partially, over many or few
attributes (Section 5.2), and tradeoffs over continuous and discrete attributes (Section 5.4). Section 6 presents a semantics
for qualitative ceteris paribus preferences that adapts the semantics of [14] to the new setting. Section 7 applies the same
techniques to interpret speciﬁcations of relative importance judgments of attributes, over many or few attributes.
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sections. This method updates one developed in earlier work [32] both to support the enhanced representation of qual-
itative preferences and to reﬂect the addition of tradeoff preferences. Section 9 shows how our tradeoff preferences can be
combined with the popular CP-net representation for conditional qualitative ceteris paribus preferences. We provide straight-
forward methods for enhancing a CP-net with quantitative tradeoffs. Section 10 concludes with a review of our contributions
and a discussion of some promising avenues for future work.
2. Related work
Our objective is to lessen the diﬃculty of decision analysis by allowing the human decision maker to express preferences
in forms he or she ﬁnds natural. Our work builds on a large and varied literature attempting to make the elicitation, speciﬁ-
cation, use, and applicability of utility functions faster, simpler, easier, and broader. Some that literature concerns operational
methods for elicitation of preferences, particularly in the case in which fundamental attributes for characterizing the deci-
sion have already been identiﬁed and one must formulate questions about the relative desirability of different combinations
of attribute values. Other parts of the literature concern languages for expressing preferences. Our main purpose in the
present work is to deﬁne a speciﬁcation language for qualitative and quantitative ceteris paribus preferences and quantitative
tradeoffs that allows direct expression of preferences and their dependence on other portions of knowledge, along with a
method of compiling a utility function consistent with the set of those statements. This section brieﬂy illustrates how our
work combines ideas and harnesses beneﬁts of prior work on preference representations.
In pursuing an approach that seeks to understand the structure of attributes that underlie preferences from expressions
of preferences about these, we follow on substantial work in the ﬁelds of multiattribute decision theory and conjoint
measurement theory. Multiattribute decision theory [25] takes utility function representations of the preferences of a
decision-maker and studies mathematical methods for decomposing these functions into weighted combinations of subfunc-
tions corresponding to different attributes or sets of attributes. Theorems of multiattribute decision theory allow inferences
about several forms of independence of attributes from the subfunctions that make up an overall utility theorem (see, for
example, [22,36,39]). We draw directly on the underlying framework of multiattribute decision theory in the following de-
velopment, and focus on using differential properties to specify the utility functions being modeled. Conjoint measurement
theory [27] takes orders over combinations of attributes as fundamental, and studies when one can use these to identify
separable orders over attributes. Conjoint measurement theory formulates families of axioms relating orders over individual
attributes to orders over combinations of attributes, with various conceptions of “cancellation” corresponding to different
forms of lifting of orders, along with statistical methods for determining when observed data ﬁts these axioms. We draw
some connections to the theory of conjoint measurement in the following, but more work would be useful here, as our
underlying methodology exhibits something of the same spirit in seeking to take facts about preferences among different
sets of attributes, in our case assorted subsets of attributes rather than all combinations of all attributes as in conjoint
measurement theory, and then relate these to preferences over individual attributes and to possible complete orders over
all attribute combinations.
2.1. Logics of preference
Researchers have long considered logics of preference, whereby an entity can specify statements in some logical language
encoding preference information. Logical statements of the form p  q, meaning formula p is preferred to formula q, can be
given varying interpretations. One of those interpretations, termed preference ceteris paribus, allows preferences that apply
“keeping other things equal.” Such a preference might be “Other things being equal, I prefer white wine to red wine.”
These preferences capture the intuitive idea that other unmentioned qualities might affect the decision making process. For
example, in a situation where white wine turns out to be much more expensive than red wine, and hence all else is not
equal, this preference would not apply.
Ceteris paribus preferences were introduced formally by von Wright [37], and later studied in semantic and inferential
terms by Hansson [23] and Doyle, Shoham, and Wellman [14]. This work describes a set of qualitative preferences that can
be used to partially order outcomes described by logical variables. Other researchers have added complexities to basic ceteris
paribus statements, including the possibility of expressing preferential independence between attributes using a specialized
syntax [2].
A simple list of ceteris paribus preferences allows reasoning with partial preference information, complex qualitative
preferences, and include information about preferential independence of various attributes or dimensions in the domain.
2.2. Conditional preference networks (CP-nets)
Also using a form of ceteris paribus preferences, come a series of graphical preference networks using different types
of preference or utility independence conditions to deﬁne the network structure. These start with the CP-net [6,5] (here
the abbreviation “CP-net” stands for “conditional preference” networks, not “ceteris paribus” networks). Nodes in the graph
correspond to single attributes and the directed edges in the graph represent preferential dependence between attributes.
In this system, one lists the preference for a particular attribute given the values of the attribute’s parents in the graph, and
1126 M. McGeachie, J. Doyle / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 1122–1152may then determine the resulting preferences over elements from the entire domain. The CP-net representation combines
these explicit preferences with explicit preferential independence and dependence, achieving eﬃcient reasoning in many
cases. Subsequent work builds upon this base in different ways, adding representations of more complex preferences.
Brafman, Domshlak and Shimony [9] considered CP-nets with tradeoffs, or TCP-nets, an extension of CP-nets that allows
expression of trade-offs between attributes. TCP-nets allow one to stipulate that one preference is more important than an-
other preference, conditioned on the value of some other attributes. This allows a TCP-net to represent preferences between
outcomes that vary on two attributes, while including attribute prioritization in the representation.
Wilson [40] uses a circumscription-like semantics for augmenting conditional ceteris paribus preference statements in
CP-nets. This representation addresses approximate reasoning, stating preferences where all else is held almost equal, by
allowing the speciﬁcation of some irrelevancies. The expression v : x x′[W ] means that given value v for attribute V , and
a list of attributes W , we prefer value x to x′ for attribute X , as long as all unmentioned attributes are held equal, while
attributes W are allowed to be equal or unequal.
To take the CP-net idea and develop it in a different direction, Boutilier, Bacchus, and Brafman [4] introduce a quantitative
extension to CP-nets called UCP-nets. A UCP-net allows a combination of utility independence information with ceteris
paribus semantics and explicit numeric utility values assigned to each preference. As [4] observe, such an approach is
warranted in cases where uncertainty is an issue, probabilities are known, and reasoning in terms of expected utility is
required.
Conditional preference networks are conceptually similar to Bayesian networks in many ways. In a more direct de-
velopment from Bayes nets, La Mura and Shoham have proposed combining Bayesian networks with a type of utility
independence networks into what they call Expected Utility Networks (EUNs) [28]. This representation differs from CP-
nets by using a type of multiplicative preference independence, rather than additive independence, which allows preference
reasoning analogous to probability reasoning and results in a representation of expected utility. In [28] preference judg-
ments are stated in multiples of the value of an arbitrary reference outcome, i.e. “being healthy and wealthy is three times
as desirable as being merely wealthy.”
In another development with roots in both Bayesian networks and preference networks, Gonzales and Perny [20,21]
discuss generalized additive independence (GAI) networks. Generalized additive independence [19,1] is a model that decom-
poses a utility function into functions of independent, but overlapping, sets of attributes. Given some domain, these are
structurally similar to the clique-trees used in inference algorithms of Bayesian networks, and similar message-passing al-
gorithms are used in utility computations in GAI nets. The GAI framework, in general, allows somewhat more complicated
utility models than simple additive independence allows.
Networks with other utility independence assumptions and conditions have been considered. Engel and Wellman [17]
deﬁne CUI-nets for conditional utility independence networks, which have a different decomposition than CP-nets, leading
to smaller representations when additive independence does not apply. This is a treatment of quantitative utility functions
where each node potentially has a utility function based on the parents of that node, elicited using standard methods from
multiattribute utility theory. This system handles both complementary attributes and substitution between attributes.
2.3. Other preference machinery
Other avenues of preference research have resulted from adding something like utility weights to propositional logic
formulae and then reasoning about the relative utility of outcomes that obtain. For example, systems based on possibilistic
logic [15] attach a “priority” to formulae in propositional logic, where priorities form a totally-ordered set. In this type of
approach one infers a preference for a condition p over a condition q from the priorities assigned to p and q, with the for-
mula given the higher priority preferred to the formula with the lesser priority. These systems are less related to the current
project than systems employing explicit preference representation and tacit preferential independence assumptions. They do
however share our intention to reason with partial preference information by encoding an arbitrary set of user statements
and then inferring preference orders from that set. More related is the work of Lang et al. [29] in which propositions are
graded with numerical “utility” values, and in which utilities assigned to situations reﬂects the sum of positive and nega-
tive rewards of each satisﬁed goal proposition. This allows comparison of situations in which multiple goals are satisﬁed.
Adding weights together creates preferences over outcomes or choices of actions, allowing an implicit utility function to be
incrementally and partially speciﬁed. In very simple cases, one might regard the ratio of utilities assigned to goals as corre-
sponding to marginal rates of substitution. Although an exact interpretation along these lines would be complicated by the
provision of the model to specify cardinal gaps in utility values for goals and the nonmonotonic provisions of the semantics,
the overall result of constructing preference orders from this additive basis exhibits a similar spirit to the constructions we
make from different semantical bases.
These approaches both base preference speciﬁcation on comparisons to an assumed standard of comparison or
“numéraire” in the language of economics. While there is nothing problematic about the notion of numéraire in stan-
dard market economics, that is the case because one can choose any market good as the standard of comparison, whether it
is an ounce of gold, a dollar, or a bushel of wheat. In contrast, starting out with a given standard of comparison, especially
intangible ones like units of currency, presupposes many unstated comparisons of that standard with things familiar to the
modeler. Our approach attempts to avoid this problem by making it possible to state direct comparisons between sets of
attributes, from which one might construct a numéraire as in market theory, from which one might identify preferential
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One can always still use some agreed numéraire as an attribute in phrasing comparisons, one need not coerce all compar-
isons into that restricted form. Eliciting preferences with respect to currency values is a common technique, but in light
of the problems people have putting dollar (or mark, or franc, or yen) values on some things, empirical work would seem
needed to determine whether people would always ﬁnd it easier than stating direct comparisons.
Part of our goal in the current work is to compile a set of preference judgments, naturally stated, into a utility function
for eﬃcient reasoning, and one example of such a system is the proposal of Domshlak and Joachims [12]. Therein, they
compute a value function from a few preference statements (of the form x  y, where x, y are formula over a space of
n binary attributes) using a support vector machine (SVM). The SVM kernel implicitly translates the n attributes into a
space of size 4n , where there is one new attribute for each attribute in the input space and for each interaction between
attributes in the input space. This translation both trivializes preferential independence concerns and provides tolerance to
some slight errors or inconsistencies in the input preferences, while enabling reasoning with partial preference information.
2.4. Going forward
Our work builds on a base of qualitative ceteris paribus preferences [38,14], and augments this with reasoning about
quantitative and qualitative preference and tradeoff information. As such, our preference machinery in this paper moves in
a slightly different direction than CP-nets. Like the collections of logical statements augmented with preference information,
we are able to reason with any number of statements; unlike CP-nets we do not require complete elicitation of preferences
for each variable or according to each independence condition. Like TCP-nets, we add tradeoff and importance statements
to ceteris paribus preferences, but we choose to add quantitative statements of importance and tradeoffs. Like UCP-nets, we
endeavor to allow eﬃcient reasoning about quantiﬁed preferences. The UCP-net has been combined with TCP-nets in recent
work [7], which provide a qualitative tradeoff semantics to UCP-nets. We will show that our quantitative tradeoffs can also
be combined with UCP-nets, in Section 9.
Our work also builds upon elements of the other preference systems mentioned in the preceding. Expected Utility Net-
works base their semantics on multiplicative judgments of value; we combine a semantics of multiplicative tradeoffs with
qualitative logical preferences. Like the SVM and possibilistic logic preference compilation techniques, we take as input a
list of statements of preference, in some natural logical form, and seek to compile them into an explicit utility function
that enables more eﬃcient preference reasoning. In addition to providing support for tradeoffs and importance judgments,
our system may be applicable in some domains where the cardinality of some attributes makes the SVM’s dimensional
translation impractical, or where explicit tradeoffs provide handy shortcuts for weighted possibilistic logic statements.
In sum, our work combines elements of many existing lines of preference reasoning and representational research. The
result, as presented in this article, is a formalism of qualitative preference ceteris paribus that combines quantiﬁed tradeoffs
and importance judgments while allowing partial reasoning and assuming no particular independence forms with a compi-
lation procedure that translates the forgoing into an explicit utility function for eﬃcient reasoning. Such a system should be
a valuable contribution to the preference research community.
3. Formal background
In this section we present the formal concepts and notation that we use throughout for outcomes, attributes, orders,
representations, and independence properties of orders.
3.1. Outcomes, attributes, and partial outcomes
For the present treatment we follow common practice and identify decision outcomes with tuples of values of a set
of attributes. Formally, let A = {Ai | 1  i  n} be a ﬁnite, enumerated set of attributes, and each attribute’s domain be
a set denoted Di . Attribute domains can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite, discrete or continuous. A set of outcomes is described byA = D1 × · · · × Dn , a cartesian attribute space.
To simplify the presentation and discussion in the remainder, we will assume throughout that the domain of each at-
tribute is numeric. In particular, we assume the use of a one-to-one function ρ : A →Rn that gives a numeric representation
of the entire attribute space, including numeric representations of nonnumeric attribute domains. We make no assumptions
regarding whether the domains of each attribute are continuous intervals or not, as this will not be of central importance
in the following.
In choosing the numeric representations of attributes, we assume that the representations conform to the character of
the underlying attribute. Numeric representations of nominal attributes can be chosen arbitrarily. For ordinal attributes,
the underlying attribute domain has a natural order, and we assume that the numeric representations are chosen to have
a numeric order consistent with that of the natural order on the represented nonnumeric values. Similarly, for interval
attributes, we assume that the numeric representation preserves distances between underlying attribute values, and for
ratio attributes, we assume that the representation preserves ratios as well.
To interpret preference statements that refer to some attributes but not to others requires means for talking about partial
outcomes deﬁned over the speciﬁc attributes mentioned by the preference statements. In fact, we employ three different
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extended with a “0” (meaning “unassigned”) value, and as vectors over subsets of attributes.
We use bundles as descriptions of outcomes in terms of partial assignments of values to attributes. A bundle (of goods) is
a partial function from A to ∐i Di , the disjoint union of domains of each attribute. For a bundle b, b(i) is the value assigned
by b to attribute i. b(i) is either undeﬁned, in which case we write b(i) = ⊥, or b(i) is a value w ∈ Di . If a bundle deﬁnes
one value for every attribute Ai ∈ A then we say it is complete. We can also write a bundle as a list of the pairs it deﬁnes:
b = {(Ai = wi), (A j = w j), . . .} where wi ∈ Di,w j ∈ D j . We call the set of attributes to which a bundle b assigns values the
support of b, and denote it by σ(b).
We deﬁne operations on bundles by deﬁning component-wise operations using standard algebra, but with additional
support for ⊥. We have ⊥ + ⊥ = ⊥, ⊥ ∗ ⊥ = ⊥, ⊥ ∗ 0 = 0, and for any real r 
= 0, ⊥ + r = ⊥ and ⊥ ∗ r = ⊥. Otherwise,
bundle addition is much like vector addition, as is multiplication of a scalar and a bundle. One multiplies two bundles
component-wise: for bundles b,b′ , we have b ∗ b′ = b′′ where b′′(i) = b(i) ∗ b′(i). Replacement of a bundle by values from
another is written b[b′] = b′′ and deﬁned as follows: b′′(i) = b′(i) unless b′(i) = ⊥, in which case b′′(i) = b(i). We also write
b[(i = w)] for the replacement of b with an implicit bundle b′ = {(i = w)}.
For each bundle b, we deﬁne a corresponding vector φ(b) ∈ Rn , which we call the value vector for b. Writing φi(b) for
the ith component of φ(b), we deﬁne φ(b) by φi(b) = b(i) whenever b(i) 
= ⊥ and φi(b) = 0 otherwise. Because value
vectorization maps both 0 and ⊥ to 0 elements in the vector, one cannot recover the original bundle from a vector unless 0
is not in Di , but this degeneracy will not matter in the following, where we vectorize bundles before computing their inner
product with other vectors, and the additional 0s make the development much simpler. Value vectorization allows us to use
operations on vectors in place of operations on bundles. For example, we use the inner product φ(b) ·φ(b′) of value vectors
to compute the inner product of bundles b and b′ . We call a vector x ∈ Rn the characteristic vector for a set of attributes
G ⊆ A iff xi = 1 iff Ai ∈ G and xi = 0 otherwise.
For each subset G ⊆ A of attributes, we deﬁne the outcomes G over G to be the cartesian product ΠG , taking the product
in the enumeration order inherited from A. If x ∈ A, we deﬁne the projection function πG : A → G so that [πG(x)]a = xa for
each a ∈ G . If g ∈ G , we deﬁne the bundle b(g) corresponding to g so that the bundle is undeﬁned on every attribute not
in G , and takes the same value as g on every attribute in G .
We write vectors next to each other when we refer to their combination; if X and Y are disjoint sets of attributes and
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , then xy refers to the vector over X ∪ Y that orders the combined values of x and y according to the
attribute enumeration order.
We call C = {C1, . . . ,Ck} a cover of the attributes A iff each Ci ⊆ A and ⋃i Ci = A. Distinct attribute subsets in a cover
need not be disjoint.
3.2. Preference orders and value functions
We model the preferences of a decision maker as an ordering over the outcomes described by A. A weak preference
ordering is a reﬂexive and transitive relation  on A where a a′ indicates that a is at least as preferable as a′ . We do not
assume or require that  forms a total order. Strict preference  consists of the irreﬂexive part of , that is a  a′ just in
case a a′ but a′ 
 a′ . When a a′ and a′  a we say a and a′ are indifferent and write a ∼ a′ .
Economics and decision theory use the terms “utility function” and “value function” to name numerical representations
of preference orders. We will use the terms interchangeably in this paper, but favor the term “value function.” Although
none of the following treats decision-making under uncertainty, for which the usual term is “utility,” our intent here is
deﬁnitely to provide a language and semantics for characterizing the structure of utility functions.
A value function, v : A →R, allows the use of  as the standard order (and therefore preorder) over the reals, and thus
over the image of A under v . We write v for the preorder on A induced by v . Complete preorders  over countable A
can be expressed exactly by value functions, so that v(a) v(a′) if and only if a a′ . We say a value function v represents
a complete preference order  when v(a) v(a′) if and only if a a′ . An incomplete preorder  is necessarily a subset of
some preorder v . When  is a subset of the preorder v , we say that v is consistent with .
We call functions vˆG : G → R partial value functions; these assign a number to partial descriptions of an outcome. We
deﬁne subvalue functions over G to be value functions vG : A → R such that vG(a) = vˆG(πG(a)). Subvalue functions over G
ignore all but some set of attributes, G . As a matter of notational convenience, we frequently use bundles as arguments
to value functions, and would write v(φ(b)) for the operation of v on the characteristic vector of a bundle b. When the
context is clear, we suppress the φ function and just write v(b).
3.3. Preferential independence
Preferential independence is a property that obtains when the contribution to value of some attributes can be determined
without knowledge of other attributes. More precisely, a set of attributes X is preferentially independent of a disjoint set of
attributes Y when the comparisons over attributes in X do not depend on the assignment of values to attributes in Y . We
state this formally in the following deﬁnition.
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with A = X ∪ Y , if and only if, for all x1, x2 ∈ X , and y1, y2 ∈ Y ,
x1y1  x2y1 → x1y2  x2y2. (3)
Note that preferential dependence is not symmetric. It is possible for a set of attributes X to be preferentially dependent
upon a disjoint set of attributes Y , while Y is independent of X . However, the case of symmetric preferential independence
is the same as satisfying the “single cancellation axiom” of conjoint measurement theory [27].
Preferential independence generally simpliﬁes the structure of the corresponding value functions. The simplest preference
structures occur when every subset of attributes is preferentially independent of every disjoint subset, which produces a
fully additive value function and a condition called additive independence. An additive value function over two attributes (or
sets of attributes) is obtained when the marginal rates of substitution do not depend on the particular value [25, p. 91]. For
D = {G, H}, with G, H disjoint, an additive value function has the form
v(a) = gi vG(a) + hi vH (a). (4)
A more general case is that seen in a generalized additive value function for a cover C = {C1, . . . ,Ck} of A is a value





The function-construction methods presented in Section 8 assume that attributes are preferentially independent when-
ever there is no evidence to the contrary, and then construct value functions with generalized additive forms over subvalue
functions representing subsets of attributes determined to be mutually dependent on the basis of preference statements
relating them.
4. A language for preference speciﬁcation
As Section 2 indicated, there are statements of preference that cannot be formally stated in existing preference reasoning
systems. Preferences regarding numerical tradeoffs cannot be combined with qualitative statements of direct preference,
ceteris paribus preference, incompletely-speciﬁed preferences, and ambivalence toward preferential independence. The tra-
ditional means for combining the import of disparate types of statements is to embed the statements in a single logical
language and provide interpretations that merge the sense of the various statements. Accordingly, in this section we intro-
duce a language and logic for preference speciﬁcation called Lopat, for Logic of Preferences and Tradeoffs that provides such
a combined representation. Lopat uses a ﬁrst-order logical language to express attributes and conditions, and adds to this
ﬁrst-order base one or more sets of preference and tradeoff relations, with each such set representing a preference order
and associated utility function over outcomes.
4.1. Base language and logic
The base of Lopat consists of a ﬁrst-order Logic of Attributes and Comparisons (Lac) obtained by choosing ﬁnite sets of
relation symbols R1, . . . , Rl , function symbols F1, . . . , Fm , and a ﬁnite or inﬁnite set of individual constant symbols C1, . . . ,
in which the constants and function symbols are used to name decision attributes. For example, a language describing
computer-purchasing preferences might include function symbols like speed, CPU, and GHz, allowing reference to the nu-
merical measurement in gigaHertz of the CPU speed of a computer X with the term GHz(speed(CPU(X))). Naturally, constants
amount to zero-ary functions, but we distinguish them from nonzero arity functions. We require that the relation symbols
of Lac include the symbols =,<,,>, representing familiar equality and inequality binary relations. We assume that the
constants of Lac include names for any numbers in R needed to state conditions and values.
As usual, an interpretation I = (D, RI1 , . . . , RIl , FI1 , . . . , FIm ,CI1 , . . .) of Lac consists of an underlying domain D together
with interpretations of each n-ary relation as a subset of Dn , of each n-ary function as a function from Dn to D , and of each
constant as an element of D .
We deﬁne satisfaction and entailment in Lac in the usual way, so that I | q just in case the meanings assigned by I
make q true. We write p | q just in case every interpretation making p true also makes q true, and for a theory (set of
sentences) S write S | q just in case p | q for each p ∈ S . We write p and S to denote the set of all models of p
and S , that is, p= {I | I | p}.
4.1.1. Logical and decision-making attributes
We regard each ground term of Lac as representing a potential decision-making attribute. For example, a theory de-
scribing computer-purchasing preferences might involve terms such as speed(CPU(X)) and GHz(speed(CPU(X))), the former
representing the CPU speed of a computer X, and the latter representing the numerical measurement of that speed in
gigaHertz.
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match the ﬁnite set of attributes presented in Section 3 to characterize our underlying treatment of decision making. We
make no assumptions that the restricted set of attributes must be given at the beginning of decision analysis, or that it
remains unchanged throughout the course of developing a decision model. We assume only that at any point in the analytic
process the set of attributes of interest is ﬁnite. More general treatments of outcomes described in terms of inﬁnitely many
attributes might be useful, we do not develop such here.
With attention focused on a set of attributes A1, . . . , An , one can regard each interpretation I of Lopat as inducing the
tuple of values (AI1 , . . . , A
I
n ), which we also denote as (A1, . . . , An)
I . If, as in Section 3, we associate a particular domain
of values with each of these attributes, we can call an interpretation I conforming (to the assumed domains) if it interprets
all attribute terms as taking values in the corresponding attribute value domains. We will assume all interpretations are
conforming throughout the remainder of this paper.
In the case of conforming interpretations, we can deﬁne the attributemeaning pa of a statement p to be the set of value
tuples possible in interpretations consistent with p, that is, pa = {(A1, . . . , An)I | I ∈ p} = {x ∈ A | x = (A1, . . . , An)I ∧
I | p}.
We do not assume that using a ground term as a decision attribute says anything about the logical or preferential
dependence or independence of that attribute on other attributes or on other terms not chosen as decision attributes.
Part of the work of decision analysis is to identify such dependencies and independencies. We also leave open questions
about how best to treat such restrictions of attention. In some settings one might translate a theory into a Datalog-like
sublanguage of Lac, that is, a sublanguage that omits all functions except for a ﬁnite set of individual constants, each of
which represents one outcome attribute.
We assume that the set of constants of Lac also includes names for any elements of the attribute domains Di needed to
express preferences and tradeoffs.
4.1.2. Attribute types and comparisons
We can use the intended orderings of attribute domains to divide the set of decision attributes into nominal and ordinal
attributes. Nominal attributes, such as colors and names, bear no nontrivial inequality relations among their values, so that
α < β is always false, and α  β is true only if α = β is true. Ordinal attributes can carry nontrivial strict total or partial
orderings over their values, orderings distinct from any preferential orderings of these values.
We have assumed a numerical encoding of all attributes for simplicity of presentation, but numerical encodings al-
ways admit order comparisons, no matter what type of attributes they represent. Our language does not forbid use of
order relations in value propositions about nominal attributes, but sensible uses of the language will avoid such as making
meaningless comparisons. We therefore extend the notion of conformance from interpretations to interpreted theories by
requiring that a conforming preference theory states no order comparisons between purely nominal attributes. We assume
all theories discussed in the following are conforming.
The focus of our use of Lac expressions in Lopat is in stating preferences and tradeoffs. We thus focus our attention on
a sublanguage of Lac in which each statement describes bundles of attribute values.
First, we deﬁne atomic value propositions to be inequalities or negations of inequalities relating attribute terms to each
other or to named domain values, and deﬁne compound value propositions to be statements formed as Boolean combinations
of atomic value propositions. We use the term value proposition to refer to both atomic and compound value propositions.
Second, we deﬁne a positive value proposition to consist of a simple equality statement (α = β) relating an attribute α
with a value β . Such statements are of course also atomic value propositions. A bundle proposition consists of a conjunc-
tion of positive value propositions in which no two conjuncts involve the same attribute. One can regard these as logical
statements of bundles as deﬁned earlier. In particular, assuming that all the attribute values have names in Lac, a bundle
b = {(i = wi), ( j = w j), . . .} corresponds to the proposition pb expressed as Ai = wi ∧ A j = w j ∧ . . . . Finally, a proposition
in disjunctive normal form (DNF) consists of a disjunction of conjunctions of atomic value propositions, that is, a disjunction
of bundle propositions.
In addition to ordinary logical interpretations of value propositions, we also regard bundles as partial interpretations, and
deﬁne the bundle meaning of value propositions accordingly.
For each bundle b, we say that b satisﬁes a positive value proposition α = w , and write b | α = w , just in case pb
assigns the value w to attribute α. We write b 
| α = w if b | α = w does not hold. It follows that b 
| α = w just in case
either b assigns some other value to α or b does not assign a value to α. We deﬁne bundle satisfaction of the other forms
of atomic value propositions similarly.
For complex value propositions p and q, we deﬁne b | (p ∧ q) to hold just in case b | p and b | q, and deﬁne b | ¬p
to hold just in case b 
| p. We deﬁne the meanings of the other Boolean connectives similarly.
4.2. Order and utility expressions
We obtain the full language Lopat by extending Lac with a set of preference and tradeoff relations {cp,cp,mt,mt,
ai,ai}, together with a restriction connective ⇒, and a ratio connective :. We use these new linguistic elements and
statements c, p, and q of Lac to form three classes of Lopat statements as follows.
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ceteris paribus preference statements, similar to those presented in [14]. We restrict such statements to comparing conditions
describable as value propositions p and q, for which we form the expression p cp q, meaning that condition q is weakly
preferred to condition p ceteris paribus, and p cp q, meaning that condition q is strictly preferred to condition p ceteris
paribus. For example, one might write ((α1 = 3) ∧ (α2 = 1)) cp ((α1 = 1) ∧ (α2 = 2)).
We form restricted or conditional qualitative preference statements by conditioning a qualitative preference statement on
a value proposition that restricts the domain of quantiﬁcation implicit in the ceteris paribus comparison. If c is a value
proposition, we form such statements as c ⇒ p cp q and c ⇒ p cp q, each of which means that the indicated preference
holds ceteris paribus among outcomes satisfying the condition c. For example, we can make statements ((α1 > 3) ∧ (α1 <
5)) ⇒ ((α2 = 3)cp (α2 = 1) ∧ (α3 = 0)).
Note that the preference conditional ⇒ has no relation to propositional implication →. It instead restricts the set of
outcomes over which a preference comparison applies. Moreover, the explicit preference conditionalization indicated in
c ⇒ p cp q is also different from the implicit conditionalization indicated in pc cp qc, because the attributes mentioned
in c play a role in the interpretation of the latter expression, but play no role in the interpretation of the former. (See
Theorem 27 of [14]; c ⇒ p cp q when pc cp qc and c has no attributes in common with p or q, but that c ⇒ p cp q can
hold even though pc cp qc is false.)
Second, Lopat includes expressions that allow one to say by how much one prefers some improvement in one condition
to some improvement in another condition. Marginal tradeoff statements take the form r : p mt s : q or r : p mt s : q for
value propositions p and q and numbers r, s ∈ R such that r, s  1. We interpret these statements such that the pair of
tradeoff factors r, s produce a meaning equivalent to the pair of tradeoff factors 1, sr . We allow omission of either or both of
the numerical factors when they take the value 1. For example one could write 2 : (α2 = 3) mt 5 : ((α1 = 1) ∧ (α3 = 0)), or
equivalently, write 1 : (α2 = 3) mt 2.5 : ((α1 = 1) ∧ (α3 = 0)). The semantics given later interprets p mt r : q as meaning,
roughly, that increases in p are at least r times as desirable as increases in q, ceteris paribus. Conditional marginal tradeoff
statements, naturally, condition a marginal tradeoff statement with a value proposition, as in c ⇒ r : p mt s : q. For example,
we can make the statement ((α1 > 3) ∧ (α1 < 5)) ⇒ (α2 = 3)mt 3 : ((α2 = 1) ∧ (α3 = 0)).
Third, Lopat includes statements that allow one to say that one set of attributes is more important than another. To
do this, we extend the language to include concrete sets of attribute names, as in {αi1 , . . . ,αik }. More general languages
might include set terms and quantiﬁcation over them, but we do not do so here. There is no substitution of equals for
equals in such expressions; it is the attribute names that matter, not their values. With concrete sets G and H and numeric
tradeoff parameters r, s 1, we form attribute tradeoff statements r : G ai s : H and r : G ai s : H . As with marginal tradeoff
statements, we can simplify such statements to ones using a single tradeoff factor, for instance, G ai sr : H , meaning,
roughly, that the attributes in G are at least sr times as important as the attributes in H . We also form conditional attribute
tradeoff statements by conditioning an attribute tradeoff statement to hold only for outcomes satisfying a value proposition,
as in c ⇒ r : G ai s : H .
4.3. Obtaining utility functions as meanings
An interpretation I = (D, RI1 , . . . , RIl , FI1 , . . . , FIm ,CI1 , . . . , v) of Lopat, accordingly, extends an interpretation of Lac with
a utility function.
Each preference or tradeoff sentence in Lopat expresses a condition or constraint on a value function, either directly by
constraining the value function or its partial derivatives, or indirectly by constraining a preference order represented by the
value function. We present the semantics for the weak preference, tradeoff, and importance statements in Sections 6–7. We
interpret the strict versions in the usual way, so that
• r : p cp s : q holds iff r : p cp s : q and r : p 
cp s : q;
• r : p mt s : q holds iff r : p mt s : q and r : p 
mt s : q; and
• r : p ai s : q holds iff r : p ai s : q and r : p 
ai s : q.
In particular, because we assume conforming interpretations, we can deﬁne the value meaning Sv of a statement or set
of statements S to be the set of value functions appearing in some interpretation of S , that is, Sv = {v | I ∈ S ∧ I =
(. . . , v)}. When v is a value function over A, we write v | S to mean that v ∈ Sv.
In general, then, combining a theory S phrased in Lopat with a set of attribute terms appearing within S determines
two things; a set of possible outcomes Sa, and a set of possible value functions Sv. We mostly ignore the restrictions
on possible outcomes in this paper, and focus instead on the interpretation of the theory in terms of value functions. The
value function construction method of Section 8 constitutes one way of computing a particular value function v ∈ Sv
when given a consistent set of sentences S .
Although Lopat offers forms of preference speciﬁcations intended to extend the range of compactly expressible utility
functions, we do not yet have a characterization of just what functions are expressible or inexpressible in Lopat. For pref-
erence orders over ﬁnite domains, one can of course construct a ﬁnite set of axioms that specify each pairwise comparison
directly, and for preference orders over countable domains, one can do the same with a countable set of speciﬁcation ax-
ioms. Such axiom sets can be interpreted as specifying any utility function consistent with the preference order. The real
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or axiom schemata, and the answer to this question is unknown at present.
Note that Lopat theories do not explicitly include symbols to represent outcomes or utility functions over outcomes. The
interpretations of the logic make sense no matter how one identiﬁes decision-making attributes among the terms of the
language. The ability to refer implicitly to utility functions comes directly from the inability to express utility values directly
in the language. The only statements Lopat allows about utility functions are ceteris paribus orderings over partial derivatives.
These can be made without reference to the utility function itself or to its domain. In effect, the language presupposes that
the utility function formally depends on all terms of the language, leaving it up to the analyst to determine on which terms
it actually depends.
5. Marginal tradeoff preferences
As indicated in Section 1, we interpret marginal tradeoff statements p mt r : q as constraints on the directional deriva-
tives of the value function. This section shows how to do this for a range of complex statements of conditions by associating
one or more directions with each of p and q. We ﬁrst dispose of what one might consider as a plausible alternative inter-
pretation.
5.1. Avoiding a value-based tradeoff semantics
The simplest possible interpretation of a marginal tradeoff comparison between bundles x and y, x mt r : y, is that
utilities of outcomes in one class are at least r times greater than utilities of outcomes in another class, that φ(x) is
preferred to φ(y) by a factor of more than r, or formally, for bundles x, y, and a, a′ ∈ A
v
(a[x]) rv(a′[y]). (6)
We choose not to pursue this interpretation because it does not allow additive independence (Eq. (4)) between attributes.
Theorem 5.1. If x and y are bundles with attributes G = σ(x) ∪ σ(y) additively independent of the attributes G, and v(a[x]) 
rv(a′[y]) for all a, a′ ∈ A, then r = 1.
Proof. Since G is additively independent of G , there exists a value function involving the subvalue function vG(a[x]) for
attributes in G . Then (6) must hold when k is a constant representing the value contributed by the attributes outside of G ,
which is the case when the assignment to attributes in G is ﬁxed, and results in
vG
(a[x])+ k r(vG(a′[y])+ k). (7)
However (7) simpliﬁes to
vG
(a[x]) rvG(a′[y])+ (r − 1)k.
This inequality can only hold independent of k when r = 1. 
Theorem 5.1 shows that a too-simplistic value-based tradeoff semantics would not be compatible with the simplest of
independence conditions. While we will give much attention to generalized additive independence, which Theorem 5.1 does
not rule out, in later sections we will be concerned to infer or assume independence conditions within a domain, and so
do not wish to preclude ourselves from using a simple additive value function. We therefore conclude that to speak about
quantiﬁed tradeoffs with nontrivial tradeoff ratios, we cannot use the simple value-based tradeoff semantics represented
by (6).
5.2. Geometric tradeoff semantics
Our semantics for marginal tradeoff statements begins by interpreting the special case in which the tradeoff conditions
represent individual bundles, and deﬁnes meanings for more complex conditions by reducing statements over complex
conditions to sets of statements over bundle conditions.
To interpret nontrivial marginal tradeoff ratios, we follow the approach of preference ceteris paribus and interpret trade-
offs as comparisons holding other attributes constant. Speciﬁcally, we regard such tradeoff statements as constraining the
partial derivatives of the utility function, as these partial derivatives explicitly hold constant attributes other than the ones
being differentiated. Constraints on derivatives stating that value increases in one direction r times faster than in another
direction constrain the shape of the utility function rather than its values, and this includes reference to the units of the
attributes.
We interpret marginal bundle tradeoffs through the following deﬁnition.
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at all points a satisfying the conditioning proposition.
For example, suppose we are comparing different computers and wish to state that a 3.6 GHz processor with a 1-MB
L2-cache and an 800 MHz front side bus is twice as good as 4 GB of ram with a 400 MHz front side bus. We can express






))= 3.6∧MB(size(cache(X)))= 1∧ GHz(speed(bus(X)))





))= 4∧ GHz(speed(bus(X)))= 0.4.
This formulation follows the representation used in Section 4.1 in making explicit both the dimensions of measurement
(speed, size) and the units of measurement (GHz, MB, GB), and distinguishing both of these from the object of measurement
(processor, cache, bus, RAM). In this case, we are talking about values for four different variables, GHz(speed(processor(X))),
MB(size(cache(X))), GHz(speed(bus(X))), and GB(size(RAM(X))), which measure processor speed in GHz, cache size in MB,
bus speed in GHz, and RAM size in GB. For typesetting convenience, we abbreviate these variables as processor, cache, bus,
and RAM in the following discussion.
The preference stated above concerns two bundles, {(processor = 3.6), (cache = 1)(bus = 0.8)} and {(RAM = 4), (bus =

























We interpret comparisons between general value propositions by reducing them to comparisons between propositions
in disjunctive normal form, and interpret marginal tradeoffs between DNF conditions p and q by regarding each conjunct
in p and q as a bundle and interpreting the comparison between these disjunctions of bundles as pairwise comparisons of
all combinations of the disjoined bundles.
Deﬁnition 5.2. The meaning of a conditional marginal tradeoff statement c ⇒ r : p mt s : q is the same as the meaning of
the statement rewritten so that the compared propositions are in disjunctive normal form, and the meaning of a conditional
marginal tradeoff statement c ⇒ r : p mt s : q in which p and q are in disjunctive normal form is the same as the meanings
of all such comparisons between conjuncts in p and conjuncts in q. That is, if the disjunctive normal form of p is p′ and
the disjunctive normal form of q is q′ , then c ⇒ r : p mt s : qv = c ⇒ r : p′ mt s : q′v, and if p =∨ X and q =∨ Y , then
c ⇒ r : p mt s : qv = {c ⇒ r : xmt s : y | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y }v.
To continue the example from computer conﬁguration, suppose we see other conﬁgurations of computers and amend our
preference from before. We now think that a 3.2 GHz or 3.6 GHz processor with a 1-MB or 2-MB L2-cache and an 800 MHz
front side bus is twice as good as 4 GB of ram with a 400 MHz front side bus. We have compound value propositions
p = (processor = 3.6∨ processor = 3.2) ∧ (cache = 1∨ cache = 2) ∧ bus = 0.8, and q = RAM = 4∧ bus = 0.4. We then convert
p into disjunctive normal form, obtaining p = (w ∨ x∨ y ∨ z) where
w = {(processor = 3.6), (cache = 1)},
x= {(processor = 3.2), (cache = 1)},
y = {(processor = 3.6), (cache = 2)},
z = {(processor = 3.2), (cache = 2)}
and letting q′ = {(RAM = 4), (bus= 0.4)}, we then have
p mt 2 : qv =
{
w mt 2 : q′, xmt 2 : q′, y mt 2 : q′, zmt 2 : q′
}
v.
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Conditional bundle tradeoffs exhibit a natural form of transitivity.
Theorem 5.2 (Transitivity). The two conditional bundle tradeoffs
c1 ⇒ xmt r1 : y, (10)
c2 ⇒ y mt r2 : z (11)
taken together entail the tradeoff statement
c1 ∧ c2 ⇒ xmt r1r2 : z. (12)
Proof. The statements (10) and (11) are interpreted, respectively, as the constraints
∇u(a) · φ(x) r1∇u(a) · φ(y), (13)
∇u(a) · φ(y) r2∇u(a) · φ(z). (14)
Both (10) and (11) apply to outcomes falling within c1 ∧ c2, the intersection of their regions of applicability. Within this
region, we can multiply (14) by r1 and then substitute back into (13), to obtain the preference part of (12). 
We now verify that the deﬁnition of quantitative tradeoffs between groups of attributes is a generalization of the stan-
dard economic notion of the marginal rate of substitution between two attributes. More precisely, the marginal rate of
substitution is usually deﬁned as the negative of the slope of the indifference curve of the value function for two commodi-
ties [24]. Speciﬁcally, in the case of unit-vector tradeoffs between two attributes, our directional derivative representation for
tradeoffs between sets of attributes reduces to a condition on the marginal rate of substitution. We show this by simplifying
the condition in Deﬁnition 5.1.
Theorem 5.3 (Marginal rate of substitution). If x is the bundle proposition Ai = 1, and y is the bundle proposition A j = 1, with i 
= j,
then the tradeoff ratio r in xmt r : y forms a lower bound on the marginal rate of substitution between attributes Ai and A j , that is,












which states the claimed bound on the marginal rate of substitution. 
The description of tradeoff preferences we have given so far is very general. In research on preference elicitation, linear
utility functions or piece-wise linear functions are considered exceedingly frequently [26,16]. It is thus worth noting that
simple linear utility functions can satisfy a bundle tradeoff, stated formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1 (Linear utility functions). If C = {C1,C2, . . . ,CQ } is a cover of A and v(a) =∑Qi=1 ti vi(a) is a generalized additive value
function with vi = vCi such that vi is linear in each attribute Ai1, . . . , AiN ∈ Ci , then v ∈ xmt r : yv iff
n∑
j=1




with ki,k j constants.
Proof. The claim follows from Deﬁnition 5.1. 
We will make use of this result in Section 8 when we construct linear value functions from preference statements in
Lopat.
Another property of the semantics we examine is the special case of colinear bundle propositions, that is, the meaning
of x mt r : y when x and y are bundle propositions and there is some number t such that φ(x) = tφ(y), that is, the
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case, the semantical condition (8) reduces to (∇v(a) · tφ(y)) r(∇v(a) · φ(y)), which is satisﬁable just in case either t  r
or ∇v(a) · φ(y) = 0.
A ﬁnal property of our semantics is that it exhibits sensitivity to the units with which one expresses bundles, in that
an attribute with a range of values between 0 and 1 will typically inﬂuence comparisons less than an attribute taking
values in the range between 1000 and 1,000,000. This is a common problem arising in many situations in which one must
measure or compare disparate attributes. One could approach the problem by normalizing attribute values and ranges in
some automatic fashion, but as has been remarked in the literature on preference elicitation, normalizing ranges can lead
to bias and misunderstanding instead of to a solution to the problem [25,3,18]. We therefore do not regard the problem as
one solvable in the abstract for all problems, and leave the burden on the decision analyst to formulate tradeoffs sensibly
in light of the differences among attributes and units of measurement. The literature on conjoint measurement theory [27]
provides some useful results addressing these problems.
It is worth mentioning, however, that at least one sort of normalization is compatible with the semantics presented here.
An earlier version of this paper used deﬁnitions that compared the bundles normalized to have unit Euclidean length, so
as to compare directional derivatives without reference to the magnitudes of the vectors used to identify the directions.
Formally, let 1(x) to be the normalized vector x/|x|, and for a bundle x let 1(x) = 1(φ(x)). The normalized semantics then
deﬁned the meaning of c ⇒ x mt r : y so that v ∈ c ⇒ xmt r : yv iff (∇v(a) · 1(x))  r(∇v(a) · 1(y)) for each a ∈ ca.
Essentially all of the theorems we state and prove in this paper hold true with the normalized semantics as well: only the
examples of utility construction differ by much. Nevertheless, this simple sort of normalization does not really alter the
underlying problem signiﬁcantly. Instead, it introduces an additional complication, for making tradeoff comparisons by only
considering the direction of different bundles but not their magnitudes means that one cannot treat comparison of colinear
bundles with the normalized deﬁnition, and must reintroduce the unnormalized semantics given here for that special case,
producing an unpleasant discontinuity of interpretation.
5.4. Marginal tradeoffs among discrete attributes
There is a natural extension of our directional derivatives formulation of tradeoffs to discontinuous value functions over
discrete attributes. When we have two bundles x, y over discrete attributes and want to say that value is increasing in
the φ(x)-direction r times faster than in the φ(y)-direction, we can still give meaning to this type of preference by using
discrete difference analogues of the partial derivatives.
For bundles of either discrete or continuous attributes, we deﬁne a discrete difference vector 
v(x, y) of complete bun-
dles x, y, to be a vector with ith component

i v(x, y) =
{
v(φ(x))−v(φ(x[(i=φi(y))]))
φi(x)−φi(y) if φi(x) − φi(y) 
= 0,
0 if φi(x) − φi(y) = 0.
A discrete difference vector is a vector of slope-approximations, where the ith component of the vector is an approximation
of the slope of v in the ith dimension.
We assign meanings to tradeoffs among discrete attributes using discrete difference vectors as follows.





) · φ(x) r
v(a,a′) · φ(y). (16)
for all complete bundles a 
= a′ such that φ(a),φ(a′) ∈ ca.
Consider a simple example of how one might use Deﬁnition 5.3 to analyze a preference stated by a certain computer
scientist who in the morning thinks that a small cup of caffeinated coffee is twice a preferable as a large cup of decaffeinated
coffee. The aim of this example is to illustrate our inferences about the scientist’s preferences, not to attribute inferences to
the scientist.
We begin by considering attributes coffee with domain {decaf , regular}, and size with domain {S,M, L}. For simplicity,
suppose ρ(decaf) = 1, ρ(regular) = 2, and for size we let ρ(S) = 1, ρ(M) = 2, ρ(L) = 3. We then have bundles x = (coffee=
regular), (size = S), y = (coffee = decaf ), (size = L), and a discrete bundle tradeoff x mt> 2 : y. This tradeoff holds when

v(a,a′) · φ(x) 2










)= (v(1,1) − v(1,3))/(1− 3).










) · φ(y) = −1(v(1,1) − v(2,1))− 3/2 ∗ (v(1,1) − v(1,3))
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−2.5v(1,1) + 2v(2,1) + 0.5v(1,3) 2 ∗ (−2.5v(1,1) + v(2,1) + 1.5v(1,3))
which simpliﬁes to v(1,1) v(1,3).
By considering other values of (a,a′) we obtain other constraints on the utility function. Consider 
v(a′,a). After simpli-
ﬁcation we obtain v(2,1) v(2,3). Let b = (2,1),b′ = (1,3), then we achieve the constraint v(2,1) v(2,3). Considering

v(b′,b) gives v(1,1)  v(1,3). Suppose we deﬁne c = (1,1), c′ = (1,3), in this case 
1v(c, c′) = 0, but after simplifying
we again get the constraint v(1,1) v(1,3), and in this case reversing the arguments to 
 gives the identical constraint.
We list these and other constraints in the following table:
a a′ Constraint
(1,1) (2,3) v(1,1) v(1,3)
(2,3) (1,1) v(2,1) v(2,3)
(2,1) (1,3) v(2,1) v(2,3)
(1,3) (2,1) v(1,1) v(1,3)
(1,1) (1,3) v(1,1) v(1,3)
(1,3) (1,1) v(1,1) v(1,3)
(1,1) (2,1) 0 0
(2,1) (1,1) 0 0
(2,3) (2,1) v(2,1) v(2,3)
(2,1) (2,3) v(2,1) v(2,3)
(2,3) (1,3) 0 0
(1,3) (2,3) 0 0
The results here suﬃce to order several values of the domain, such that (2,1) which corresponds to (regular, S) is the
element most preferred and (decaf , L) is the least. In contrast to the continuous development in the previous section, values
of 
v(a,a′) can be used to provide additional constraints, but we conjecture that only values of a,a′ such that ai = xi or
ai = yi will provide new, unentailed, constraints. A proof of this conjecture is left to future work.
The following theorem shows the meanings assigned to c ⇒ xmt r : y by Deﬁnition 5.3 for discrete tradeoffs is compat-
ible with the meaning assigned to the same statement by Deﬁnition 5.1 for continuous tradeoffs in the case in which we
take continuous attributes and a differentiable value function and regard the attributes instead as discrete.
Theorem 5.4 (Continuous tradeoffs). If x and y are bundles of continuous attributes and v is a differentiable function over A that
satisﬁes the discrete inequality (16) for all complete bundles a 
= a′ such that φ(a),φ(a′) ∈ ca , then v also satisﬁes the continuous
inequality (8).





) · φ(x) r
v(a,a′) · φ(y) (17)
for all complete bundles a 
= a′ ∈ ca. Since v is differentiable, the terms in the expansion of the discrete difference are




)− v(φ(a[(i = φi(a′))]))/(φi(a) − φi(a′)), (18)
which holds at all a,a′ , for φi(a) 
= φi(a′), and approximates the slope of v in the ith dimension. We can choose a′ such







)− v(φ(a[(i = φi(a) − h)]))/h. (19)
Since (19) is equal to ∂v











which is the deﬁnitional condition for the continuous inequality (8). 
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Qualitative ceteris paribus preference statements state that one condition is preferable to another, other things be-
ing equal. The conditions are typically expressed as logical combinations of values of various attributes, so “other things
being equal” means comparing only outcomes that do not differ on attributes not involved in either of the conditions being
compared. The comparison, moreover, is made without implying anything about possible tradeoff ratios. Qualitative ceteris
paribus preferences have served as the basis for numerous representations of preference information, including [14,32,5].
6.1. Reinterpreting qualitative ceteris paribus preferences
The semantics given here to the qualitative ceteris paribus preference statements included in Lopat differs somewhat from
that given to comparable statements treated in [14]. We explain the difference in the following. To keep the two conceptions
separate, we use the comparison operators DSW and DSW in this section to refer to statements and semantics of the form
considered in [14]. Statements involving DSW or DSW are not included in Lopat.
The support of a value proposition p, denoted σ(p), is the minimal set of attributes determining the truth of p. Bundles b
and b′ are equivalent modulo p if they take the same values outside the support of p. Formally, b ≡ b′ mod p iff b[a] =
b′[a] for some bundle a over σ(p). More generally, we say that b ≡ b′ mod p1, p2, . . . if b[a] = b′[a] for some bundle over
σ(p1) ∪ σ(p2) ∪ . . . . With these notions in hand, we can restate the meaning deﬁnition from [14] as follows.
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Qualitative ceteris paribus preferences, Deﬁnition 3 in [14]). If p and q are value propositions and v is a value
function, then v ∈ c ⇒ p DSW qv iff v(b)  v(b′) for all bundles b,b′ ∈ ca such that b | (p ∧ ¬q), b′ | (q ∧ ¬p), and
b ≡ b′ mod p,q. Similarly, v ∈ c ⇒ p DSW qv iff v ∈ c ⇒ p DSW qv and v(b) > v(b′) for some b,b′ ∈ ca such that
b | (p ∧ ¬q), b′ | (q ∧ ¬p), and b ≡ b′ mod p,q.
For the comparisons expressed in Lopat, tradeoffs between discrete attributes generalize ceteris paribus preferences be-
tween binary attributes. This formulation is stated most simply in terms of binary attributes. A ceteris paribus tradeoff
between two binary attributes can be thought of as stating that “a change in P from ¬p to p is preferable to a change
in Q from ¬q to q.” For discrete attributes with larger domains, the statement becomes “a change in P from p j to pi is
preferable to a change in Q from q j to qi .” The deﬁnition that follows implements this intuition.
Deﬁnition 6.2 (Qualitative ceteris paribus tradeoffs). If p and q are value propositions with σ(p) = σ(q) and v is a value





v(a[q],a[p]) · φ(q) (20)
for all complete bundles a such that φ(a) ∈ ca.
For example, we can state preference concerning wine and food in the context of classical dining; suppose we have
attributes A = {meal,wine} and let meal have two values: b1 = meat, b2 = ﬁsh and wine have two values: w1 = red,
w2 = white. We can then deﬁne clauses p1 = ﬁsh ∧ white and q1 = ﬁsh ∧ red, and state qualitative ceteris paribus trade-
off p1 cp q1. We state another preference using clauses p2 =meat ∧ red and q2 =meat ∧white, where p2 cp q2. We make
the assumptions that ρ(meat) = 1, ρ(ﬁsh) = 2, ρ(red) = 1, and ρ(white) = 2. Using these simpliﬁcations, we proceed as we
did in Section 5.4 and consider the values of 









2v((2,2), (2,1))= v(2,2) − v(2,1).





) · φ(p1) = 2(v(2,2) − v(2,1)), 
v((2,2), (2,1)) · φ(q1) = v(2,2) − v(2,1)
and these leave us with the constraint on the utility function v(2,2) > v(2,1). Similarly, we consider the condition from
p2  q2, or 
v((1,1), (1,2)) · φ(p2) > 
v((1,1), (1,2)) · φ(q2), and through similar calculations, obtain v(1,1) > v(1,2).
Restating this in terms of the qualitative domains of each attribute leaves us with v(ﬁsh,white) > v(ﬁsh, red), and
v(meat, red) > v(meat,white); note that these mirror the stated ceteris paribus preferences: ﬁsh ∧ white cp ﬁsh ∧ red and
meat ∧ redcp meat ∧white.
The semantics given here for ceteris paribus preferences differs from that given in [14], in that [14] interprets p DSW q in
terms of bundles satisfying p ∧ ¬q and q ∧ ¬p. The support of these propositions can differ in some cases, and our present
semantics avoids this complication.
The following theorem shows that, for linear value functions, the deﬁnition given for qualitative ceteris paribus com-
parisons obeys a useful property of the value function: that the outcomes satisfying the left-hand side of the preference
relation have greater value than those on the right-hand side.




for each complete bundle a such that φ(a) ∈ ca .




xi − yi xi 
∑
j∈σ (y)
v(a[y j]) − v(a[x j])
y j − x j y j.
Multiply those terms that have negative denominators by −1−1 , let z
+ be the indices of φ(x) and φ(y) such that xi > yi , and




xi − yi (xi − yi)
∑
j∈z−
v(a[y j]) − v(a[x j])
y j − x j (y j − x j).
The differences in the numerators of the above summations are simply the increase of the value function in a particular
dimension. When v is linear, this slope is constant, and without loss of generality let ti be the slope in the i-dimension,





t j(y j − x j),





t j y j  0.





The preceding theorem can be used to draw a correspondence between the deﬁnitions of ceteris paribus preference given
in Deﬁnitions 6.1 and 6.2, showing that a comparison x′ DSW y′ of two literals in the language of [14] can be represented
by the same value function as represents the Lopat bundle comparison b[x′,¬y′]cp b[¬x′, y′] for an empty bundle b.
Theorem 6.2. Let x′ and y′ be two binary attributes with x′ 
= y′ , let b be an empty bundle, and let x and y be bundles such that
x= b[x′,¬y′] and y = b[¬x′, y′]. Then every linear value function in c ⇒ xcp yv is also in c ⇒ x′ DSW y′v .
Proof. Suppose v ∈ c ⇒ xcp yv is linear. By Theorem 6.1, we have v(a[x]) v(a[y]) for every complete bundle a ∈ ca.
Now we clearly have a[x] ≡ a[y] mod x′, y′ , so by Deﬁnition 6.1, v is in c ⇒ x′ DSW y′v. 
This result shows that some statements of weak preference between binary attributes expressed using DSW can be
transformed into statements of weak preference expressed using cp such that they are satisﬁed by the same linear value
functions, if any exist.
7. Marginal attribute importance
We have so far considered tradeoffs between particular instances of attributes: an assignment to some attributes G is
preferred to an assignment to some attributes H , ceteris paribus, or by some factor r. In this section we describe tradeoffs
of the form G ai r : H between groups of attributes, which can also be considered a statement about the importance of the
groups of attributes, namely that “attributes G are more important than attributes H by a factor of r.”
By saying that one set of attributes is more important than another, we mean to say that the ﬁrst set has a larger
inﬂuence on the value function than does the second. The inﬂuence of an attribute on value does not depend on any
direction in the space of outcomes, on the inﬂuence being a positive or negative contribution to value, or on the particular
instantiations of attributes being considered. It is, instead, purely a measure of the weight assigned to an attribute itself. We
expect such comparisons mainly arise during elicitation of preferences, in which one might want to talk about the relative
value of attributes and sets of attributes.
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reviews various techniques for obtaining, assuming, or computing the relative importance of attributes in a value function.
Our presentation here extends the usual decision analysis methodology in three ways. The ﬁrst is that, as was stated in
the introduction to this paper, the decision maker is not required to make any importance statements at all, for we merely
take as many importance statements as occur and consider them alongside the other preference information we have. The
second is that we do not expect decision makers to talk about importance in just one attribute. The importance statements
we describe herein are between sets of attributes. Someone may decide that the combination of restaurant attributes meal-
quality, drink-quality, and atmosphere-quality are at least twice as important as time-to-arrive and time-spent-waiting at a
restaurant. The third difference is that instead of simply assigning a numeric weight to each attribute as a way of expressing
attribute importance, as is often done, we instead interpret importance comparisons in the same geometric framework used
for marginal tradeoff statements, in particular as a comparison between the norms of the gradients associated with different
sets of attributes.
We formalize the geometric interpretation of conditional attribute importance statements as follows. Given an arbitrary
subset G ⊆ A and a function vG over G , the gradient ∇vG (x) at a point x ∈ G is a vector based at x pointing in the direction
of maximum increase of vG in G . The length |∇vG(x)| of that vector is the magnitude of that increase. Thus if we interpret a
tradeoff between a set of attributes G and another set of attributes H as a comparison between the maximum possible rates
of increase in the subspaces deﬁned by G and H , we can write that comparison in terms of the magnitudes of gradients in
those spaces. Speciﬁcally,∣∣∇vG(a)∣∣ r∣∣∇vH (a)∣∣ (22)
compares the increase in the G-space to the increase in the H-space. Further, if we choose the L1 norm to measure the
length of the above vectors, inequality (22) is equivalent to
∑
f ∈G
∣∣∣∣ ∂v∂ f (a)
∣∣∣∣ r∑
f ∈H
∣∣∣∣ ∂v∂ f (a)
∣∣∣∣. (23)
Let x and y be the characteristic vectors for G and H , respectively, then (23) is equivalent to
|A|∑
i=1




∣∣∣∣ ∂v∂ Ai (a)yi
∣∣∣∣. (24)
With this in mind, we deﬁne the meaning of attribute importance tradeoffs as follows. We write abs() to denote the absolute
value of the gradient, that is, the absolute value of each element in a vector, so that abs(x) = 〈|x1|, |x2|, . . . , |xn|〉. We use this
notation to distinguish the absolute value from the length of the vector, |x|. For the following statement, recall that a vector
x ∈ A is the characteristic vector for G if x is such that xi = 1 iff Ai ∈ G and xi = 0 otherwise.
Deﬁnition 7.1 (Attribute importance tradeoffs). If x and y are characteristic vectors for attribute sets G and H respectively,
then v ∈ c ⇒ G ai r : Hv iff(
abs
(∇v(a))) · x r(abs(∇v(a)) · y) (25)
holds on all points a ∈ ca.
The condition (25) is clearly equivalent to (24) and so also to (23).
Consider a simple example. Suppose we are going out to eat and need to pick a restaurant. In this context, among
the things we might consider are the time required: the time to get to a given restaurant, and the time spent waiting
once at the restaurant. For instance, we can let travel time (tt) and wait time (wt) be continuous attributes measured in
minutes, where less is better. We state a tradeoffs about these attributes: minutes(waittime) ai 1.5 : minutes(traveltime),
which indicates that, in this estimation, it is roughly 50% more annoying to wait at the restaurant than to travel to it. For
brevity, we deﬁne A = {wt, tt}, as shorthand for the longer propositional attributes. The characteristic vectors for wt and tt
are, respectively, (1,0) and (0,1). From these, we can compute the condition provided on the utility function by Eq. (25),
and obtain: | ∂v
∂wt (x)| > 1.5| ∂v∂tt (x)|.
Deﬁnition 7.1 thus relates the “maximum increase” measure of importance between attribute sets to the “directional-
derivative” representation of importance comparisons. This correspondence allows us to use the intuitive characterization of
importance tradeoffs as comparisons of the maximum increase in two different subspaces while extending the framework
of partial derivatives presented in Section 5 for the formal semantics.
One may object that comparing the maximum increase of value in different subspaces seems an arbitrary choice, for
we could compare other statistics of the spaces instead, such as the average increase, the median increase, or the increase
at the origin. However, comparing the maximum increase of value in a space is appropriate in many cases, especially in
what has been called “conﬁguration problems,” in which the goal is to ﬁnd the conﬁguration of some elements (a schedule,
a composite product, a results set, etc.) in a domain that maximizes the utility of the conﬁguration. These situations are
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however the choice among outcomes is made, that is the outcome that results. In these cases, a rational actor will always
choose the outcome with greatest value, so the comparison of interest is between maximum increases in various constrained
spaces of the conﬁguration problem.
7.1. Properties of the semantics
We ﬁrst present two simple corollaries to Deﬁnition 7.1.
Corollary 7.1. If G\H 
= ∅, then c ⇒ G ai r : H is satisﬁable.












and choose weights for attributes not in G\H arbitrarily. The function v so deﬁned then satisﬁes v ∈ c ⇒ G ai r : Hv. 
Corollary 7.2. The conditional attribute tradeoff statement c ⇒ G ai r : G is satisﬁable only if r  1 or if ∇v is zero over attributes G.
Proof. We have v ∈ c ⇒ G ai r : Hv only if(
abs
(∇v(a)) · x) r(abs(∇v(a)) · x)
for each a ∈ ca. This is satisﬁed by any r  1, and when the inner product of the absolute value of the gradient of v at a
with x is zero. Since x is a characteristic vector for G , it contains only zeros and ones. Since we take the absolute value of
∇v(a), the elements of that vector are all greater or equal to zero. The inner product of two nonnegative vectors is zero
only when each of the terms in the summation are zero. This is the case only when the gradient is zero in each attribute
in G . 
Our deﬁnition of an attribute tradeoff ratio leaves open the possibility that the two sets of attributes involved are not
disjoint, in which case the following result applies.
Theorem 7.1 (Intersecting attributes). If G, H are sets of attributes with J = G ∩ H and v ∈ c ⇒ G ai r : Hv , then∑
f ∈(G\ J )
∣∣∣∣ ∂v∂ f (a)
∣∣∣∣ r ∑
f ∈(H\ J )
∣∣∣∣ ∂v∂ f (a)
∣∣∣∣+ (r − 1)∑
f ∈ J
∣∣∣∣ ∂v∂ f (a)
∣∣∣∣
for all a ∈ ca .
We omit the proof, but it follows directly from Deﬁnition 7.1 by rearranging terms. An important corollary of Theorem 7.1
is the case in which one set of attributes contains the other.
Corollary 7.3. If G and H are sets of attributes such that H ⊂ G and r > 1, then
c ⇒ G ai r : Ha =

c ⇒ G\H ai (r − 1) : H

a.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. By deﬁnition G ai r : H is∑
f ∈G
∣∣∣∣ ∂v∂ f (a)
∣∣∣∣ r∑
f ∈H
∣∣∣∣ ∂v∂ f (a)
∣∣∣∣.
Since H ⊂ G , we can split the ﬁrst summation, giving
∑ ∣∣∣∣ ∂v∂ f (a)
∣∣∣∣+ ∑
∣∣∣∣ ∂v∂ f (a)
∣∣∣∣ r∑
∣∣∣∣ ∂v∂ f (a)
∣∣∣∣.
f ∈(G\H) f ∈H f ∈H
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∑
f ∈(G\H)
∣∣∣∣ ∂v∂ f (a)
∣∣∣∣ (r − 1)∑
f ∈Y
∣∣∣∣ ∂v∂ f (a)
∣∣∣∣,
which establishes our equivalence. 
Theorem 7.1 shows that intersecting attributes imply simpliﬁed constraints on the utility function, while Corollary 7.3
shows that only in the case of one attribute set being contained within the other does this reduce to an attribute tradeoff
between disjoint sets of attributes.
For an example of a different character, someone preparing for armed conﬂict might wish to state that “Guns and bullets
together are r-times more important than guns or bullets individually.” This is an example of complementary attributes that
are worth more together than they are separately, and it captures the desire of the quartermaster to balance, somehow,
the amount of guns acquired and the amount of ammunition for those guns. Let us assume for simplicity that in this
case A = {#guns,#bullets}, which are continuous attributes representing the number of guns and of bullets. Then suppose
that the decision maker encodes his intuition as two importance statements: ﬁrstly, {#guns,#bullets} ai r : {#guns}, and
secondly, {#guns,#bullets} ai r : {#bullets}. By applying Corollary 7.3 these are equivalent to the pair
{#bullets} ai r − 1 : {#guns},
{#guns} ai r − 1 : {#bullets}.
It is clear that these cannot hold simultaneously.
We remark, however, that it is possible to express a related sentiment using conditional attribute importance statements.
We could state that:
(
#guns> k(#bullets)






⇒ {#guns} ai r : {#bullets}.
Together, these mean that while the number of one attribute, guns, is k times more than the number of bullets, it is more
important to gain additional bullets; while if this is not the case, then the attribute importance is reversed.
Just as with bundle tradeoffs, attribute tradeoff statements reduce to linear conditions on the parameters of linear value
functions. We state here a lemma for attribute tradeoffs similar to Lemma 5.1. Recall that for a bundle b, σ(b) is the support
of b, the set of attributes assigned values other than ⊥ in b.






Just as tradeoff statements are transitive over common conditions, so are statements of conditional importance.
Theorem 7.2 (Attribute transitivity). The conditional attribute tradeoff statements
c1 ⇒ G ai r1 : G ′,
c2 ⇒ G ′ ai r2 : G ′′
taken together entail the tradeoff statement
c1 ∧ c2 ⇒ G ai r1r2 : G ′′.
We omit the proof, which parallels that of Theorem 5.2 exactly.
7.2. Importance of discrete attributes
We extend attribute importance comparisons over continuous value functions to comparisons over discrete attributes, as
we have done with bundle tradeoffs. Again, we use discrete difference equations as analogues to partial derivatives.
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)) · x r(abs(
v(a,a′)) · y) (27)
for all complete bundles a,a′ such that φi(a) 
= φi(a′) with φ(a),φ(a′) ∈ ca.
It should be clear that this deﬁnition allows a correspondence between the discrete case and the continuous case,
much as using a discrete approximation of partial derivatives suﬃced in the case of attribute tradeoffs. The arguments
involved parallel those of Deﬁnition 5.3. Because much of what is said of discrete attribute tradeoffs can be said of discrete
importance tradeoffs, we do not repeat those statements here. We note that the limitations on (a,a′) in the deﬁnition
parallel the differentiability constraints of the continuous case.
We will, however, revisit the case of the coffee-drinking scientist. In our previous incarnation of this example, we saw
that a small cup of caffeinated coffee is twice a preferable as a large cup of decaffeinated coffee. Suppose we make the
tradeoff more explicit with an attribute importance statement: coffee is equally or more important than size. Recall attribute
coffee has domain {decaf , regular}, and size has domain {S,M, L}. We thus have a preference coffee ai size. Using the
translation deﬁned before, ρ(decaf ) = 1, ρ(regular) = 2, and for size we let ρ(S) = 1, ρ(M) = 2, ρ(L) = 3. The characteristic







)) · (1,0) abs(
v(a,a′)) · (0,1).
Consider a = (1,3), a′ = (2,1), and the above becomes∣∣
1v((1,3), (2,1))∣∣= ∣∣(v(1,3) − v(2,3))/(1− 2)∣∣,∣∣
2v((1,3), (2,1))∣∣= ∣∣(v(1,3) − v(1,1))/(3− 1)∣∣.














)) · (0,1) = 0+ ∣∣0.5(v(1,3) − v(1,1))∣∣
and these leave us with the constraint on the utility function: |v(2,3)− v(1,3)| 0.5|v(1,3)− v(1,1)|. Similarly, a = (2,1),
a′ = (1,3) gives us the constraint on the utility function: |v(2,1) − v(1,1)|  0.5|v(2,3) − v(2,1)|. Other values of (a,a′)
are shown in the table below, together with the constraint they imply on the utility function.
a a′ Constraint
(1,3) (2,1) |v(2,3) − v(1,3)| 0.5|v(1,3) − v(1,1)|
(2,1) (1,3) |v(2,1) − v(1,1)| 0.5|v(2,3) − v(2,1)|
(1,1) (2,3) |v(2,1) − v(1,1)| 0.5|v(1,3) − v(1,1)|
(2,3) (1,1) |v(2,3) − v(1,3)| 0.5|v(2,3) − v(2,1)|
Note that including values of (a,a′) such that φi(a) = φi(a′) result in either trivial constraints (e.g., |v(2,1)− v(1,1)| 0) or
in unsatisﬁable constraints (0 |v(1,3) − v(1,1)|).
8. Value function construction
We have given many representations of different types of preferences. It remains now to join them together by providing
value functions consistent with partial orderings over the attribute space representing a given set of preferences.
In this section, we consider questions concerning construction of value functions that represent a satisﬁable set of state-
ments, including conditional qualitative ceteris paribus preferences, conditional marginal tradeoffs, and conditional attribute
tradeoff statements. The questions we address are the following. Can one ﬁnd a value function consistent with a consistent
set of preference statements? Under what circumstances can we ﬁnd one eﬃciently? Does this provide a uniﬁed and ﬂexible
framework for the expression of various types of preferences?
In light of these aims, we clarify that we do not provide a consistency checking procedure for a set of statements
in Lopat. We are merely constructing a satisfying value function, the existence of which implies that the statements in
question are consistent; but the absence of which does not imply the statements are necessarily inconsistent. Furthermore,
we aim to ﬁnd only one function consistent with a set of statements, and not all such functions. We regard the problems
of deducing what a set of preference speciﬁcations entail as a harder problem than merely constructing an example of their
satisﬁability. However, this example, corresponding to test cases, can sometimes help identify missing conditions on the
desired preferences, and so provide some information of the preferences’ scope and reﬁnement.
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preferences over binary attributes. The presentation given here is updated to accommodate all of the types of preferences
discussed so far. There are still some sections and results that require little modiﬁcation from the original, and as such are
skipped here. For the modiﬁed theorems we present here as analogues to the theorems of [32], a more complete treatment
is found in [30].
8.1. Value functions from qualitative ceteris paribus preferences
In previous work [32], we considered how to create value functions from qualitative ceteris paribus statements. For con-
sistent sets of ceteris paribus preferences over small domains, it is practical to use a method based on the ordering implied
by the statements over the entire domain. The idea is to look at the preference graph for a set of such statements, then use
some variant of a topological sort of that graph to rank-order the nodes of the graph in approximate desirability. Such an
ordering is isomorphic to a value function consistent with the input preferences. This technique is generally too ineﬃcient
to be used on an entire domain, but works well for the constituent subvalue functions of an additive value function.
We describe in [32] a method for computing possible additive value decompositions of the domain attributes based on
a set of qualitative ceteris paribus preferences. The method produces a collection of subsets of the attributes such that an






for a cover C of the attributes A.
This method is based on a technique using the structure of qualitative ceteris paribus preference statements to determine
which attributes are necessarily preferentially dependent. This allows us to make intelligent assumptions about the structure
of the value functions that are consistent with the input preferences. To extend this method to our current situation we
need to determine which attributes are preferentially independent given a set of marginal and attribute tradeoff preferences.
We will show here that no such methods are possible, but we also show that no such methods are necessary.
To examine this question we examine two concerns in this section. Firstly, does a tradeoff statement between attributes G
and attributes H imply that G and H are preferentially independent? The answer is no. Secondly, is it possible that G and H
are preferentially independent? The answer is yes whenever the tradeoffs made between G and H are satisﬁable.
It is not true that every tradeoff statement means there must be preferential independence between the related at-
tributes. We present this result by demonstrating a counterexample.
Theorem 8.1 (Preferential dependence). There exists v ∈ bmt r : b′v with b,b′ nonempty bundles over A such that v has σ(b)
preferentially dependent on σ(b′).
Proof. We exhibit a simple example. Let A = {X, Y }. Let bundles b = (X = 1),b′ = (Y = 1), and a value function v(x, y) =
(rx+ y − 1)2 that exhibits preferential dependence of X on Y . 
The opposite concern is also interesting. Is it always possible to create a linear additive value function (and therefore one
that exhibits preferential independence) given any set of tradeoff preferences? In fact, one can construct a piecewise linear
value function for any set of satisﬁable preferences.
Theorem8.2 (Preferential independence). For any satisﬁable set of unconditional marginal tradeoff statements T , there exists v ∈ T v
such that v is linear in each attribute in A.
Proof. We are given some set T of unconditional marginal tradeoff preferences of the form b mt r : b′ over some set of
attributes A. These tradeoff statements, in turn, require that the partial derivatives of the value function satisfy conditions C
of the form
∇v(a) · φ(b) r∇u(a) · φ(b′)
for all a, a′ ∈ A and for some particular bundles b,b′ . These constraints C hold at all points a in the preference space.
A solution to C is a value for ∇v(a). If C is satisﬁable, the solution to constraints C is a vector of numbers, let it be w , and
this vector is the vector of partial derivatives ∇v(a). In this case there exists v with ∇v(a) = w for all a ∈ A. This function v
satisﬁes the condition, and proves the theorem. 
One can extend this result to conditional tradeoff statements by considering piecewise linear value functions, but we do
not do so formally here. Each condition divides the space into two parts, so by considering the regions deﬁned by consistent
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in the following section.
These two results combine to show that we can use our previous algorithm for computing a generalized additive de-
composition from a set of preferences without modiﬁcation. Although we have more and different types of preferences
in the current case, these two results show that only the ceteris paribus preferences are relevant to deﬁning the additive
decomposition of the attributes.
8.2. Value function construction
The algorithm of [32] for computing a generalized additive decomposition results in a partition of A : C ′ = {C ′1,C ′2, . . . ,
C ′Q } and corresponding set of sets of attributes B ′ = {B ′1, B ′2, . . . , B ′Q }, such that each set of attributes C ′i is preferentially
dependent on the attributes B ′i and preferentially independent of A\B ′i . We deﬁne a cover C = {C1,C2, . . . ,CQ } such that
Ci = (C ′i ∪ B ′i). Given the cover C , we construct an additive value function that is a linear combination of subvalue func-
tions vi , each subvalue a separate function of a particular Ci . We associate a scaling parameter ti with each vi such that the





We will argue that this is consistent with a set of preferences M where M is a set of qualitative ceteris paribus preferences
statements, conditional marginal tradeoff statements, and conditional attribute tradeoffs in Lopat. Given the cover C , we
have two remaining tasks: to craft the subvalue functions vi , and to choose the scaling constants ti . We will accomplish
these two tasks in roughly the following way. We partition input preferences into two sets, ceteris paribus and tradeoff
preferences. We use ceteris paribus preferences to make subvalue functions and the tradeoff preferences provide linear con-
straints in a linear programming problem that sets the weights ti . There is a method in [32] that further partitions ceteris
paribus preferences into those used to make subvalue functions and those that provide additional linear constraints on the
scaling parameters. We say no more about subvalue functions here, techniques from [32] apply without modiﬁcation. To
assign values to scaling parameters ti , we will deﬁne a set of linear inequalities which constrain the variables ti . The lin-
ear inequalities can then be solved using standard methods for solving linear programming problems. The solutions to the
inequalities are the values for the scaling parameters ti .
8.2.1. Adding tradeoffs to qualitative ceteris paribus preferences
We are going to construct three lists of linear inequalities, I , I ′ , I ′′ , that must be satisﬁed by choosing appropriate
subvalue function parameters ti . The constraints in list I will come from the given ceteris paribus tradeoff statements in M .
These are computed by the methodology of [32], along with the subutility functions. I ′ will represent the constraints in the
bundle tradeoffs, and I ′′ , from the attribute tradeoffs.
Let M ′ and M ′′ be sets of marginal tradeoff and importance statements, respectively. For each marginal tradeoff statement















and the partials can be computed from the subutility functions. Let the set of these constraints for all S ∈ M ′ be the set of
linear inequalities I ′ .
Then if we consider all the attribute statements S ′ ∈ M ′′ , we will obtain additional linear inequalities bounding the
tradeoff parameters ti of the value function. For each attribute tradeoff statement S ′ ∈ M ′′ with S ′ = G ai r : H , S ′ where
x, y are the characteristic vectors for G, H :
(
abs
(∇v(a)) · x) r(abs(∇v(a)) · y). (30)
Let the set of these constraints for all S ′ ∈ M ′′ be the set of linear inequalities I ′′ .
We will discuss conditional statements for conditions other than True⇒ S in the following subsection.
Any value function v ∈ I ′, I ′′v is consistent with the tradeoff and attribute preferences the inequalities represent. We
state the theorem here, which is true by deﬁnition of the preferences.
Theorem 8.3 (General inequalities). Let M ′,M ′′ be sets of marginal tradeoff and attribute preferences in Lopat, respectively. If the
system of linear inequalities, I ′ ∪ I ′′ , has a solution, this solution corresponds to a value function v such that v ∈ M ′ ∪ M ′′v .
Proof. Follows from the deﬁnitions of marginal and attribute tradeoff preferences. 
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phrase this as a linear programming problem, and use any of a number of popular linear programming techniques to ﬁnd
scaling parameters ti .
The number of inequalities in I ′ is determined by the number of the statements in the tradeoff preferences. Simple
marginal tradeoff preferences True ⇒ xmt r : y and attribute tradeoff statements True ⇒ G ai r : H contribute one linear
inequality each. (Note that if statements are given in disjunctive normal form, like True ⇒ d mt r : d′ then this statement
results in a number of inequalities: |d| ∗ |d′|.) Consequently, preferences M ′,M ′′ add a polynomial number of inequalities to
inequality set I .
8.2.2. Piecewise linear value functions
When preferences are conditional, and hold at different regions in the outcome space A, these various preferences imply
different constraints on the value function in separate regions of A. In general these constraints are not simultaneously
satisﬁable, and this necessitates different value functions for different regions of the space. In this way, the value function
for one region can satisfy the constraints required of the value function in that region, and a value function for another
region can satisfy the constraints for that region. The value function for the whole attribute space A is then a collection
of different value functions for different subsets of the attribute space. Since each of these value functions are linear, the
whole becomes a piecewise linear value function.
Deﬁnition 8.1 (Piecewise value function). U is a piecewise value function if U is a set of pairs (V , vV ) where V is a compound
value proposition and vV : A →R is a value function.
U assigns the value vV (x) to x when x ∈ V a. We write U (x) for the value U assigns to x. In this way, a piecewise
value function is like a switch or case statement in a programming language; it selects which of several value functions to
use based on the input.
When the value functions are linear in each of the attributes, different constraints on the value function are the result of
conditional preferences. This is straightforward; different preferences can be conditioned on different regions of the space,
using the conditional preferences provided in the language Lopat.
The conditional tradeoffs expressed in Lopat are binary conditions. In some region of the attribute space, the preference
holds, and in the remainder of the attribute space, the preference does not apply. Thus, given k conditional statements, each
with independent conditions, we have as many as 2k separate divisions of the attribute space with different preferences
holding in each division.
Given k conditional tradeoffs, we can deﬁne the 2k subsets of the attribute space by the intersection of a unique subset of
the k conditions. Let W be the set of condition statements corresponding to M ′ , then each w ∈ W is a separate compound
value statement. Any subset V ⊆ W holds on a region of the attribute space deﬁned by ∧{w | w ∈ V }.
For each subset V of W , the set of tradeoff preferences that hold over the corresponding space is just that which
correspond to the conditions. We state this in the following theorem.
Theorem 8.4 (Space conditions). Given a set of conditional preferences M, with corresponding conditions W , each subset V ⊆ W
deﬁnes a region of the attribute space
∧{w | w ∈ V } where preferences corresponding to V in M hold.
Proof. This theorem follows directly from the deﬁnition of conditional preference. 
Note that if condition
∧{w | w ∈ V } is unsatisﬁable, then V describes no portion of the attribute space, and so requires
no further consideration.
This theorem deﬁnes the regions of the space where different constraints hold. However, just because these regions
have different constraints, it does not mean that the constraints are mutually exclusive or unsatisﬁable. Given a set of
conditions W and two subsets, V ⊂ W , V ′ ⊂ W , if the value function constraints holding over V ∪ V ′ are satisﬁable by
some value function v ′ , then this value function can be used for V ∪ V ′ .
In the presence of conditional tradeoff preferences, we proceed as follows. For a set of conditional and unconditional
tradeoff and attribute preferences {M ′ ∪ M ′′}, consider the set W of conditions on those preferences. For each subset V
of W , let J be the set of preferences from {M ′ ∪ M ′′} conditioned by V . Then for preferences J ∪ M , we can construct sets
of linear inequalities as discussed in the preceding section; the solution to this set of linear inequalities gives us a value
function. This value function, in turn, is the value function for the subset of the attribute space indicated by
∧{w | w ∈ V }.
In this way, we construct separate value functions for different sections of the attribute space.
The methods of dealing with different conditions on tradeoffs here can be computationally diﬃcult. It is possible that
borrowing techniques from constraint satisfaction literature would be eﬃcacious here.
8.3. A detailed example
Let us consider an example and how it can ﬁt into the frameworks mentioned above. Suppose we are going out to eat in
Boston, and need to pick a restaurant. We consider the food, the wine, the atmosphere, the time to get there, and the time
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expedience can be a serious concern. Let A = 〈m,w,a, tt,wt〉 for meal, wine, atmosphere, travel time, and wait time. Then let
meal have two values: b1 =meat, b2 = ﬁsh; wine have two values: w1 = red, w2 =white; and atmosphere have three values:




p2 w ﬁsh∧white ﬁsh∧ red
p3 w meat ∧ red meat ∧white
p4 a quiet  gaudy
p5 a gaudy  bland
These preferences mean that we prefer ﬁsh to meat. Preferences p2 and p3 mean that our preference for wine depends
on the main course. The remaining two preferences establish an order over the possible restaurant atmospheres.
Travel time and wait time are numeric attributes where less is better. We state tradeoffs about these attributes: wt ai
1.5 : tt , which indicates that is roughly 50% more annoying to wait at the restaurant than to travel to it. These preferences
have laid the groundwork for a tradeoff between groups of attributes: {m,w,a} ai 10 : {tt,wt}. Suppose someone in the
dinner party asserts that {(wt = 15), (tt = 10)} mt {(m = meat), (w = white)}, meaning that a moderate delay is preferable
to having white wine with dark meat. This last preference (p8, below) is somewhat fanciful but illustrates the tradeoff
between delay and meal quality. We then have these three tradeoff preferences:
Preferences
p6 wt ai 1.5 : tt
p7 {m,w,a} ai 10 : {tt,wt}
p8 {(wt = 15), (tt = 10)} mt {(m =meat), (w =white)}
Preferences p6–p8 imply the following conditions on the partial derivatives of the value function:
Conditions
s1 | ∂v∂wt (x)| > 1.5| ∂v∂tt (x)|
s2 | ∂v∂m (x)| + | ∂v∂w (x)| + | ∂v∂a (x)| 10(| ∂v∂tt (x)| + | ∂v∂wt (x)|)
s3 15 ∂v∂wt (x) + 10 ∂v∂tt (x) > ∂v∂m (x) + ∂v∂w (x)
We return to the ordinal attributes, and can now construct subvalue functions for each of the attributes, or, in this
case, for each preferentially independent set of attributes. Here attribute w is preferentially dependent on attribute m, so
following the system of [32], we generate one subvalue function for {m,w}, one subvalue function for a, one for tt, and
one for wt. For the qualitative attributes, we can specify their subvalue functions simply by assigning numbers to each of
the qualitative alternatives of each attribute, and using these assignments as the output of the subvalue function for these
attributes, respectively. To continue this example, let us assign subvalue functions as follows:
Subvalue Value Subvalue Value
v{m,w}(ﬁsh,white) 3 va(quiet) 3
v{m,w}(ﬁsh, red) 2 va(gaudy) 2
v{m,w}(meat, red) 2 va(bland) 1
v{m,w}(meat,white) 1
For numeric attributes wt and tt, we can choose a simple linear subvalue function. We take vwt = −wt and vtt = −tt .
The subvalue functions are now known, and the form of the value function (additive) is known, that is, the value
function is of the form: v(a) =∑i ti vi(a). But before we can use the inequalities involving the partial derivatives of the
value function, we must assign value functions, ρ , that take the discrete domains to numbers. We proceed in the most
straightforward way, and assign values as follows:
Value function Value Value function Value
ρm(ﬁsh) 2 ρa(quiet) 3
ρm(meat) 1 ρa(gaudy) 2
ρw (white) 2 ρa(bland) 1
ρw (red) 1
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subvalue function with respect to the value of our ordinal attributes, and therefore we can compute the partial derivatives
of the value function and simplify conditions s1, s2, and s3. We must consider that we have different partial derivatives at
different vectors in A. In particular, when we evaluate the partials of v with respect to m and to w, we let x be in the
domain of m, and y be in the domain of w . In these cases we have
∂v
∂w
(x, y) = t{m,w}
(







(x, y) = t{m,w}
(





Note that the other partial derivatives are straightforward (following from Lemmas 5.1 and 7.1). Thus, using the above, when
we ﬁx m = ﬁsh when computing ∂v
∂w (w) and w = white when computing ∂v∂m (m) we have
|2t{m,w}| + |t{m,w}| + |ta| 10
(|−ttt | + |−twt |).
Similarly if we ﬁx m =meat and w =white then
|2t{m,w}| + |−t{m,w}| + |ta| 10
(|−ttt | + |−twt |),
and m = ﬁsh with w = red gives
0+ |t{m,w}| + |ta| 10
(|−ttt | + |−twt |).
Finally ﬁxing m =meat and w = red gives this constraint
0+ |−t{m,w}| + |ta| 10
(|−ttt | + |−twt |).
Some of these constraints are identical because of the absolute value functions, so we can collect cases into two, and have
3t{m,w} + ta  10(ttt + twt) w =white,
t{m,w} + ta  10(ttt + twt) w = red.
When computing the constraints implied by condition s3, we get slightly different results for m =meat and for m = ﬁsh.
These appear with the other constraints on the parameters of the value function in the table below:
Constraint
c1 3t{m,w} + ta  10(ttt + twt ) w =white
c2 t{m,w} + ta  10(ttt + twt ) w = red
c3 twt  1.5ttt
c4 15twt + 10ttt > tmw m = ﬁsh
c5 15twt + 10ttt > −tmw m =meat
These systems of linear inequalities can be solved for the different cases, in principle resulting in piece-wise linear value
functions. In this case, since constraint c1 follows from constraint c2, and c5 from c4 for positive t ’s, there is no need to
have different functional forms of the value function based on different values of the w attribute. Therefore, a solution for
this construction is tm,w = 1, ta = 50, twt = 3, and ttt = 2.
Thus a value function for this example is
v(x) = vm,w(x) + 50va(x) + 3vwt(x) + 2vtt(x).
Such a value function can then be used to make decisions between different alternatives. Consider the three hypothetical
restaurants in the following table:
A B C
wt −15 −45 −25
tt −15 −5 −60
a loud simple elegant
m,w ﬁsh, white ﬁsh, white meat, red
v() −22 −42 −43
In such a situation restaurant A is preferable.
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In the preceding, we have described several parts of an algorithm for computing with qualitative ceteris paribus preference
statements, marginal tradeoff preferences, and conditional attribute tradeoffs. This has given us enough tools to accomplish
our goal: generating a value function consistent with various types of input preferences. We will outline the algorithm for
such here.
The algorithm takes as input a set M of qualitative ceteris paribus preference statements, of marginal tradeoff statements,
and of attribute statements, in the language Lopat, and parameters for building subvalue functions (from [32]). Simply
speaking, a generalized additively independent cover of the attributes is computed. Then the preferences are interpreted as
constraints on the partial derivatives of the value function. Next, the conditions on the preferences are considered, and a
partition of the attribute space is created. Then the constraints are solved using linear programming; giving values for the
parameters of the additive value function. The algorithm ﬁnally outputs a piecewise linear value function U , a set of pairs
(V , vV ) such that each value functions vV is consistent with the input preferences at a different region V of the attribute
space A.
Some remarks must be said about the failure conditions of this algorithm, by which we mean, the algorithm encoun-
tering error conditions that cause it to stop. First of all, the algorithm may fail because the steps concerning merely the
qualitative ceteris paribus preferences can fail; these are heuristic methods. As we discuss in [32], consistent ceteris paribus
preferences can always be represented by a trivial value function; one that orders each outcome according to the pre-
order implied by the preferences, but this gains none of the advantages of a generalized additive decomposition value
function.
Secondly, a set of tradeoff preferences cannot be considered to be consistent or inconsistent without knowledge of
the partial derivatives of the value function. The partial derivatives of the value function, in this case, are determined by
the generalized additive decomposition of the attribute space. Thus we cannot know with certainty before the algorithm
determines the additive decomposition of the attribute space if the tradeoff preferences are consistent or not.
With these shortcomings in mind, we must consider this algorithm heuristic. There is always the possibility of con-
ﬂicting preferences leading to no solution. However, when the algorithm ﬁnds a solution, it is guaranteed to represent the
input preferences faithfully. This algorithm, therefore, fulﬁlls its main purpose: it illustrates that tradeoff preferences can
in principle be combined with qualitative ceteris paribus preferences of the type presented in Section 6. Indeed, we show
in the next section that tradeoff preferences can be combined with the CP-net representation of qualitative ceteris paribus
preferences.
The soundness of this algorithm can be proven by reference to the preceding theorems of this article, and to those
appearing in [30].
Theorem 8.5 (Soundness). Given a set of ceteris paribus, marginal tradeoff, and attribute preferences M, if the above-outlined algo-
rithm produces a piecewise linear value function U , then U ∈ Mv .
A proof appears in [30].
9. Quantitative tradeoffs and CP-nets
In general, the tradeoffs and importance preference statements described in this article generate linear constraints on the
parameters of additive value functions. These constraints can be easily integrated with any preference or utility estimation
system that uses linear inequalities to constrain the parameters of possible value functions. And since linear models of
utilities are so common in practice, the system we have proposed should be widely applicable. In the previous section we
showed how to combine tradeoff preferences with the method of [32]. In the present section we show how to combine the
linear inequalities generated from our preference tradeoff statements with the CP-nets system. We stress that integration
with these two systems are merely representative of other possible integrations.
Methods proposed by Brafman, Domshlak, and Kogan [8] take CP-nets [5] and TCP-nets [9] and generate a value func-
tion consistent with the order implied by the CP-net or TCP-net. These methods use qualitative ceteris paribus preference
as their input, and output a generalized additive-independent ordinal value function. When we consider the system we
have presented in this article alongside the systems based on CP-nets, we ﬁnd there are differences of expressiveness and
tractability. CP-nets place restrictions on the form of the preference statements, and make independence relationships ex-
plicit; the methodology we have presented allows arbitrary qualitative ceteris paribus preferences and infers independence
from the statements. The restrictions on CP-nets allow strong tractability results. Acyclic TCP-nets, for example, always allow
eﬃcient value function construction [7]. Such differences mean that both CP-nets and the preference statements presented
herein may be appropriate in different situations.
We now demonstrate that the various quantitative tradeoffs we have developed ﬁt easily together with CP-nets. And,
following that exposition we will brieﬂy outline a correspondence between our tradeoffs and the tradeoffs of TCP-nets [9].
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9.1. Adding quantitative tradeoffs to CP-nets
To add quantitative tradeoffs to CP-nets we require two things of the value function; one, that it should be a generalized
additive value function and two, that it should have linear subvalue functions.
Using the methods of [8,7] to compile a CP-net into a value function, commits us to using a generalized additive value
function. We can force the subvalue functions (termed “factors” in that source) of this value function to be linear in their
input by adding additional inequalities to the system of linear equations that generates the value function. These conditions
assure that our tradeoff statements in Lopat can be easily added to the CP-net.
The system of linear inequalities constructed by [7, Section 3] has one variable per input per subvalue function, so
we can add additional linearizing inequalities assuring that the output of the subvalue function for X is linear in X . The
proper ordering among values of X can be found by considering the CP-Family of X [7, Section 3], and computing a dif-
ferent linear program for each possible ordering consistent with the CP-Family. This is a locally-exponential addition to
the complexity of value function construction, so the problem remains in P when the exponents are bounded by a con-
stant.
After assuring the subvalue functions are linear in their input, it is simple to solve an additional system of linear inequal-
ities which constrain the tradeoff ratios between subvalue functions. This new problem has one variable for each subvalue
function, representing the weight given to it in the generalized additive value function, and one or more inequalities for
each tradeoff statement S ∈ Lopat. Each tradeoff statement results in linear constraints on the tradeoff parameters of the
value function, but may result in different constraints over different areas of the domain of the value function. This is
the case when the preferences over one attribute, and thus partial derivatives with respect to that attribute, switch with
the values assumed by a different attribute. Such is the normal case of utility dependence between attributes. In these
cases, the value function will be a piecewise linear one, having different functional forms for different parts of its do-
main.
9.2. A CP-net example
We previously considered an example involving choosing a restaurant in Boston. We will work through the same example
here, again, but this time in a CP-net framework. This illustrates the differences between the CP-net formalism and the
methods presented earlier in this article.
We again choose A = 〈m,w,a, tt,wt〉 for meal, wine, atmosphere, travel time, and wait time, just as in the previous
example.
The simple ceteris paribus preferences we used before, p1–p5 can be used to construct a CP-net.
In a CP-net for these preferences, we have to consider which attributes are preferentially dependent. In this case only w
depends on m so we draw the CP-net as shown in Fig. 1.
We likewise use the same tradeoff preferences (p6–p8) from our previous example. These tradeoffs imply the same
constraints as before, but here they are an addendum to the CP-net framework: we will keep them aside for now.
To compute a value function for the CP-net we must solve a system of linear inequalities, of the form of inequality 1
in [8]. In this case, it results in the following linear inequalities:
Preferences
e1 va(quiet) > va(gaudy)
e2 va(gaudy) > va(bland)
e3 vw (ﬁsh,white) > vw (ﬁsh, red)
e4 vw (meat, red) > vw (meat,white)
e5 vm(ﬁsh) + vw (ﬁsh,white) > vm(meat) + vw (meat,white)
e6 vm(ﬁsh) + vw (ﬁsh, red) > vm(meat) + vw (meat, red)
We can then add linearizing inequalities to the system, forcing 3kava(quiet) 2kava(gaudy) kava(bland) and 3kava(quiet)
2kava(gaudy)  kava(bland), using a new variable ka . We make similar inequalities for vw and vm . We require these
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methodology. A solution is as follows:
Subvalue Value Subvalue Value
vm(ﬁsh) 2 vw (ﬁsh,white) 4
vm(meat) 1 vw (ﬁsh, red) 3
va(quiet) 3 vw (meat, red) 2
va(gaudy) 2 vw (meat,white) 1
va(bland) 1 ka 1
km 1 kw 1
For attributes wt and tt, we use these linear subvalue functions : vwt = −wt and vtt = −tt .
The partial derivatives of the value function are different in the CP-nets example than those in our previous example. We
compute the partial derivatives of v with respect to each attribute, paying special attention to the formulae for the partials
of m and of w . For x ∈ {ﬁsh,meat} and y ∈ {white, red}, we have
∂v
∂w
(x, y) = tw
(







(x, y) = tw
(




ρ(ﬁsh) − ρ(meat))+ tm(vm(ﬁsh) − vm(meat))/(ρ(ﬁsh) − ρ(meat)).
Thus, when we ﬁx m = ﬁsh when computing ∂v
∂w (w) and w =white when computing ∂v∂m (m) we have
|tw | + |3tw | + |tm| + |ta| 10
(|−ttt | + |−twt |).
Similarly if we ﬁx m =meat and w =white then
|−tw | + |3tw | + |tm| + |ta| 10
(|−ttt | + |−twt |),
and m = ﬁsh with w = red gives
|tw | + |−tw | + |tm| + |ta| 10
(|−ttt | + |−twt |).
Finally ﬁxing m =meat and w = red gives this constraint
|−tw | + |−3tw | + |tm| + |ta| 10
(|−ttt | + |−twt |).
As we did with the constraints in the last example, we can again collect cases into two, and have
4tw + tm + ta  10(ttt + twt) w =white,
2tw + tm + ta  10(ttt + twt) w = red.
These constraints can then be collected with all other constraints on the parameters of the value function. We then have
the following constraints on the parameters of the value function:
Constraint
c1 4tw + tm + ta  10(ttt + twt ) w =white
c2 2tw + tm + ta  10(ttt + twt ) w = red
c3 twt  1.5ttt
c4 15twt + 10ttt > tw m = ﬁsh
c5 15twt + 10ttt > −tw m =meat
The only remaining step is to solve this system of linear inequalities for the tradeoff parameters t . As in the previous
example, constraint c1 follows from constraint c2, so there is no need to have different functional forms of the value
function based on different values of the w attribute. A solution to the CP-net system of inequalities is tm = 1, tw = 1,
ta = 50, twt = 3, and ttt = 2.
Thus a value function for the CP-net is
v(a) = vm(a) + 50va(a) + vw(a) + 3vwt(a) + 2vtt(a).
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It should be clear from the preceding discussion that the qualitative ceteris paribus preferences in a CP-net can be trans-
posed with little diﬃculty to ceteris paribus preferences in Lopat.
The conditional preferences of a CP-net are of the form: c ⇒ x1  x2 for an attribute X and values x1, x2 ∈ D(X) and
some conditions in c such that X /∈ σ(c). In the formalism of the CP-network, the conditions c involve the parents of
attribute X according to the network topology of the network; in a ceteris paribus preference in Lopat c is merely a set
of arbitrary conditions. We state that a conditional preference from a CP-net c ⇒ xi  x j is equivalent to a ceteris paribus
preference c ⇒ xi cp x j , although we leave a proof of this to future work.
The tradeoffs in TCP-net are conditional qualitative tradeoffs, wherein a selector set of attributes Z determine the partic-
ular tradeoff between two other attributes X, Y . In [9], this is written RI(X, Y |Z), meaning that the Relative Importance of
X and Y is conditional on values taken by attributes in Z . When the relative importance of X is greater than that of Y ,
then written X z Y any (small) increase in X is preferable to any (possibly large) increase in Y . In these cases, there is
a preference order over the domain of X expressed in the CP-net portion of the TCP-net, and similarly with Y . In Lopat,
we can express a structurally similar tradeoff by z1 ⇒ X ai r : Y together with z2 ⇒ Y ai r : X , where z1 indicates values
of Z for which X  Y and z2 indicates values of Z where Y  X . We have only to choose a very small value of r such that
it approximates the dominance of X  Y ; we must choose r such that r times max i, j(vY (yi) − vY (y j)) is smaller than
mini, j(v X (xi) − v X (x j)). Again, we leave a proof of such equivalence, as well as selection methods for r, to future work.
While the forgoing may lead to possible advantages of mixing representations, it may be advantageous to convert a
CP-net or TCP-net to preferences in Lopat if the CP-net or TCP-net cannot be fully elicited or speciﬁed.
10. Conclusions
We have presented novel methods for enriching systems of qualitative ceteris paribus preferences with quantitative
tradeoffs of various types over multiple attributes. These preference systems can then be compiled into quantitative value
functions using modiﬁcations of existing techniques. Our work here has provided an important extension to both the sys-
tems of [31] and [5].
The main contribution of this article has been the representation of tradeoffs as constraints on the partial derivatives of
the value function. We have demonstrated that this general approach to tradeoff semantics is broad enough to cover (1)
tradeoffs between particular values of attributes, (2) importance constraints between sets of attributes, (3) multiattribute
tradeoffs of each preference type considered, and (4) tradeoffs over discrete and continuous attributes.
We also obtained numerous results relating these types of constraints to each other and to earlier notions. Our seman-
tics for multiattribute marginal tradeoffs, applied to pairs of individual attributes, reduces to the notion of marginal rate
of substitution familiar in economics, and our semantics for discrete marginal tradeoffs allows for rerepresentation of the
qualitative ceteris paribus preferences of Doyle, Wellman and Shoham [14]. Among our new concepts, we show that discrete
marginal tradeoffs reduce to continuous bundle tradeoffs, that discrete attribute tradeoffs reduce to continuous attribute
tradeoffs, and that discrete marginal tradeoffs reduce to discrete attribute tradeoffs when the bundles involved are equiva-
lent to the characteristic vectors of the sets of attributes related in the attribute tradeoff.
These results show that one can combine all of these tradeoff preferences into a single methodology, together with
qualitative ceteris paribus preferences, for computing a value function representing preference statements of all forms. Fur-
thermore, these combination methods can function with however many or few preferences happen to be available, these
preferences can be over any attributes, and there need be no explicit preferential independence or preferential dependence
given with the preferences. These are all signiﬁcant departures from the assumptions underlying traditional decision analy-
sis.
Our representation of tradeoff statements as constraints on the partial derivatives of the value function is novel, and
it raises many new questions for further research, both in its own right, and in interaction with ceteris paribus preference
statements.
The basis of our interpretation of attribute importance tradeoffs is the ratio of gradients of the value function. Our use
of the magnitude of the gradient of the value function to calibrate the relative utilities of two subspaces is a heuristic
choice, and one could employ other measures instead, such as some kind of average-case improvement measure that tries
to capture the average case outcome.
Some problems for further investigation concern the interaction of complex constraints on derivatives over nonlinear
subvalue functions, especially when constructing piecewise linear value functions and when considering preferentially de-
pendent attributes and preference reversals. When do preference reversals result in mutually incompatible constraints? Do
preference reversals require negative values of the subvalue function scaling parameters? Can one characterize the types of
subvalue functions that require piecewise linear solutions and those that do not?
One might investigate the integration of our partial-derivative based tradeoff preferences with other preference reasoning
systems. There could be a stronger integration of our results with TCP-nets. One might seek a combination with answer-set
solvers that incorporate preference representations [11]. A combination with a machine-learning system based on an SVM
architecture [12] might be straightforward, but the value of this combination of techniques would require assessment.
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